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NOTES
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES: JURISDICTION OF
THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER
THE TCPA
Fabian D. Gonell*
INTRODUCTION
[Courts'] use of legislative history [is] the equivalent of entering a
crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for
one's friends.'
From 1960 to 1995, the caseload of the federal district courts more
than tripled.2 Over the same period, the caseloads of federal appel-
late courts increased by approximately a factor of thirteen.' This ex-
panding caseload has led to numerous calls for reform,4 including
many from the judiciary itself.5 Most of the proposals call for a shift-
ing of cases from federal to state courts, particularly cases not involv-
ing significant national interests.6
* This Note is dedicated to Kristin Cassandra Lund. I would like to thank Pro-
fessor Tracy E. Higgins for her invaluable guidance, and Professor Howard M. Erich-
son for sparking my interest in jurisdictional questions.
1. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (para-
phrasing Judge Harold Leventhal).
2. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts 15 tbl.3 (1995).
3. Id. at 15 tbl.4.
4. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Be-
tween State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "Tire Martian Chronicles", 78
Va. L. Rev. 1769 (1992) (calling for a complete reexamination of federal jurisdiction);
Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and tire Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selec-
tive Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 171 (1995) (proposing the
creation of a new system of "national courts" staffed by state judges for interstate
cases); Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to Substan-
tially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary
Blueprint for Remodeling Our National Houses of Justice and Establishing a Separate
System of Federal Criminal Courts, 37 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 535 (1996) (calling for a
vastly expanded and specialized federal court system).
5. For various proposals written by members of the judiciary, see Jon 0. New-
man, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 Judicature 187
(1993); Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Reformation
Model of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. Rev. 1905 (1993); Robert M. Parker &
Leslie J. Hagin, Federal Courts at tie Crossroads: Adapt or Lose!, 14 Miss. C. L Rev.
211 (1994) [hereinafter Parker & Hagin, Adapt or Lose!]; Dolores K. Sloviter, Diver-
sity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 76 Judicature 90 (1992); Thomas G.
Nelson, The Future of the Federal Courts: Tire Case for a Mission Statement, Advocate
(Idaho), Aug. 1994, at 12.
6. See, e.g., Richard M. Bilby, Letters: Not the Real World, 74 Judicature 177,228
(1991) (calling diversity jurisdiction "silly" and "an insult to state court systems" and
asking "do you really want federal judges spending great amounts of precious judicial
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Congress, however, is more likely to increase federal jurisdiction
than to decrease it.7 In 1997, 70 bills were introduced authorizing fed-
eral jurisdiction over new civil causes of action.8 Only one bill con-
tained a provision to reform jurisdiction,9 and it would have
prohibited plaintiffs from initiating suit in federal courts located in
their home states.10 Even this modest proposal did not make it into
the version of the bill that was passed by the house.
Despite these bleak statistics, 1997 was not a total loss for oppo-
nents of expanding federal jurisdiction. Two circuit courts, analyzing
the private right of action created by the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act' 2 ("TCPA"), held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
those actions.' 3 In early 1998, another circuit adopted these deci-
sions. 4 Thus, for the first time since the enactment of the general
federal question jurisdiction statute,15 Congress has created a federal
action that cannot be brought in a federal forum.' 6
time on nickel and dime narcotics cases?"); Newman, supra note 5, at 194 (calling for
the elimination of district court jurisdiction over diversity cases and some federal
question cases); Parker & Hagin, Adapt or Lose!, supra note 5, at 232-35 (proposing
that all federal jurisdictional legislation be considered according to "four sets of Fed-
eral Court Fundamentals," which include, among other things, that federal courts will
safeguard significant national interests).
7. See Symposium, The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 263, 270
(1996) (keynote address of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William H. Rehnquist)
("[In talking about the future of the federal courts, we must understand that Con-
gress probably will continue to enact new legislation that provides new causes of ac-
tion.., on the civil side of the docket and new federal crimes... on the criminal side
of the docket."); Williams, supra note 4, at 537 ("The growth in federal litigation is
certain to continue. In recent years, Congress has expanded, rather than restricted,
the scope of federal laws .... ); see also Nelson, supra note 5, at 12 ("[Tlhe thought
that Congress will actually [restrict jurisdiction] is so optimistic as to be downright
giddy.").
8. Search of WESTLAW, CONG-BILLTXT Database (Mar. 1, 1998) (running
the following terms and connectors query: TE(("MAY BRING" "MAY BE
BROUGHT") IS (SUIT ACTION) /S COURT) % TE(("ATI'ORNEY GENERAL"
SECRETARY) +S "MAY BRING")).
9. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 2294, 105th Cong. (1997) (en-
acted by the House).
10. Id. § 302.
11. See 144 Cong. Rec. H1247-54 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1998) (quoting the version of
H.R. 2294 passed, without § 302, by the house).
12. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994)).
13. See Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir.
1997); International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106
F.3d 1146, 1158 (4th Cir. 1997).
14. See Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir.
1998).
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994)).
16. The only other federally created action over which states have exclusive juris-
diction is a claim for the resolution of mining rights under 30 U.S.C. § 30, which was
passed in 1872. See Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 7, 17 Stat. 91, 93-94 (now codified
at 30 U.S.C. 30 (1994)). For a discussion of this statute and the Supreme Court's
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Congress passed the TCPA in 1991.17 The TCPA amended the
Communications Act,'8 and sought to protect consumers and busi-
nesses from unsolicited automated telemarketing and facsimile calls.19
The TCPA provides that "[a] person or entity may, if otherwise per-
mitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate
court of that State" a private action to recover monetary damages for
violations of the act, or to enjoin such violations.20  A dispute has
arisen over the interpretation of the statute's jurisdictional language.
As noted above,2' three circuit courts have ruled that the language
operates to exclude federal courts from jurisdiction over suits arising
under the Act. 2 One district court has disagreed with those circuits'
readings of the TCPA, 3 and several district courts have implicitly as-
sumed jurisdiction over private TCPA actions.24
This Note analyzes the controversy over the jurisdiction of private
rights of action under the TCPA. Part I examines the two ways Con-
analysis of federal jurisdiction over actions brought under it, see infra notes 47-56 and
accompanying text.
17. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994)).
18. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
throughout 47 U.S.C.). The Communications Act created the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC") and preempted all state regulation of interstate communi-
cations. Id.
19. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 105 Stat. at 2394-95. Congress noted
that the telemarketing industry was "growing by immense proportions" and that the
decrease in long-distance telephone rates and the use of emerging technologies had
made telemarketing more cost-effective. S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 2 (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1969-70. A survey had found that "about 75 percent of per-
sons contacted favored some form of regulation of these calls, and one-half of these
favored prohibiting all unsolicited calls." Id. at 3, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1970. Efforts by the states to regulate telemarketing had limited effect, because the
Communications Act stripped states of the power to regulate interstate calls. Id., re-
printed in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1970.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (1994).
21. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
22. See Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289 (lth Cir.
1998); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1997);
International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d
1146, 1158 (4th Cir. 1997); see also infra Part III (analyzing Nicholson, Chair King,
and International Science). Tvo federal district courts have also found that state
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over private TCPA actions. See Murphey v. Lanier,
No. 97-CV-1784-BTM(POR), 1998 WL 154410, at *1 (S.D. Ca. Mar. 30, 1998);
Foxhall Realty Law Offices v. Telecommunications Premium Servs., Ltd., 975 F. Supp.
329) (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
23. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912, 915 (S.D. Ind. 1995). This
court also denied a motion to reconsider after the Fourth Circuit decided Interna-
tional Science. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (S.D. Ind.
1997).
24. See Joseph N. Main P.C. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 573 (N.D.
Tex. 1996) (denying motion for class certification in private TCPA action); Forman v.
Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same); Lutz Appellate Ser's.,
Inc. v. Curry, 859 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (dismissing TCPA claim on 12(b)(6)
motion).
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gress grants federal question jurisdiction. Part II explores the legisla-
tive history of the TCPA. Part III analyzes the circuit decisions which
held that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over private TCPA
actions. Part IV analyzes the district court decision that rejected the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning, and argues that federal jurisdiction over
TCPA private actions is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Note
concludes that jurisdictional language merely permitting state court
jurisdiction, such as that in the TCPA, should not divest federal courts
of § 1331 jurisdiction absent clearly expressed congressional intent to
repeal
I. THE SOURCES OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution directs that
the judicial power of the United States "shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. '26 Congress's power to "ordain and
establish" lower federal courts "has generally been understood to im-
ply a power to create [such courts] vested with less than the maximum
jurisdiction that the Constitution would allow."' 27 Thus, although Ar-
ticle III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides for "fed-
eral question" jurisdiction,28 the federal district courts can only
25. Section 1331 is the general federal question jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994). It provides for federal district court jurisdiction for all cases "arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.; see also infra Part
I.A.
26. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
27. Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Fed-
eral System 348 (4th ed. 1996); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697
(1992) (noting that "[t]he Court's cases state the rule that 'if inferior federal courts
were created, [Congress was not] required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it
was authorized to bestow under Art. III.' (alteration in original) (quoting Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973))); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,
234 (1922) ("[Congress] may give, withhold or restrict [federal district court] jurisdic-
tion at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the
Constitution."); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) ("[Congress] pos-
sess[es] the sole power of creating [inferior federal courts] and of investing them with
jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for
the public good.").
28. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority .... U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Since Osborne v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), the Supreme Court has given this
clause an expansive meaning. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.2.2, at
256-62 (2d ed. 1994). Osborne stands for the proposition that "the Constitution per-
mits Congress to create federal court jurisdiction whenever federal law is a potential
ingredient of a case." Id. at 258. Osborne continues to be good law. See American
Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 257-65 (1992) (upholding federal jurisdiction
over actions to which a federally-chartered corporation was a party when the charter
authorized the corporation to "sue and be sued" in federal court); Verlinden B. V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1983) (upholding jurisdiction under
1898 [Vol. 66
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exercise federal question jurisdiction when it has been specifically au-
thorized by statute.29
Congress has used two different types of statutes when granting fed-
eral question jurisdiction: general grants of jurisdiction, not tied to a
specific cause of action,30 and specific grants of jurisdiction over a par-
ticular cause of action.3' There is often overlap between the two types
of grants, with the existence of the general statute rendering a specific
grant virtually superfluous.32 A proper reading of a specific grant,
therefore, requires an understanding of the general jurisdictional stat-
ute that provides the backdrop against which it was enacted. Thus,
this part turns first to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and then proceeds to analyze
specific grants of jurisdiction.
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Congress passed the statute that became 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on March
3, 1875.' 3 As now codified, the law provides that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 3 The statute had
an amount in controversy requirement35 until 1980, when it was re-
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which grants federal courts the author-
ity to hear suits by an alien against a foreign state).
29. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 777 (1983) ("Since federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction, the court below could hear the case only if authorized by stat-
ute."); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 701 (1982) ("Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is... limited to those
subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction."); United States v. Hud-
son, 11 U.S. 21, 22, 7 Cranch 32, 33 (1812) (noting that lower federal courts "possess
no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates them").
30. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (granting federal district courts jurisdiction
over cases "arising under" the Constitution, treaties, or federal law); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (1994) (granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts over suits
"arising under" the patent laws).
31. See, eg., 7 U.S.C. § 25(c) (1994) (providing that federal district courts "shall
have exclusive jurisdiction" over actions to recover damages resulting from violations
of Commodities Exchange regulations); 25 U.S.C. § 3013 (1994) (providing that fed-
eral district courts "shall have jurisdiction" over actions to enforce the Native Ameri-
can Graves Protection and Repatriation Act); see also infra Part I.B.
32. Despite the general grant of federal question jurisdiction, Congress often in-
cludes a specific grant of jurisdiction in a statute creating a cause of action. For exam-
ples of such grants, see infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
33. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
35. An amount in controversy requirement is a requirement that at least the speci-
fied amount be at issue before federal jurisdiction is invoked. See Charles Alan
Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 32, at 190 (5th ed. 1994). The amount is determined
by the plaintiffs good faith claim, unless it can be determined to a legal certainty that
the claim is for less than the requisite amount. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). The amount was initially set at $500. See Act
of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994)). By 1980, when the amount was repealed, it was $10,000. See Federal
1998] 1899
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pealed by the Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of
1980.36 Other than this repeal, the federal question jurisdiction stat-
ute has remained essentially unchanged since 1875. 37
Although the language of § 1331 tracks the Constitutional language
granting federal courts federal question jurisdiction almost exactly,38
the Supreme Court has always interpreted the statutory language
more narrowly.39 The Court has never, however, announced a clear
Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat.
2369, 2369 (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
36. See § 2(a), 94 Stat. at 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Thus, since 1980, any
specific mention of federal district courts in a statute creating a new federal cause of
action has jurisdictional meaning only inasmuch as it protects the action from the
repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See infra note 342. Before the amount in controversy
requirement was repealed, explicitly mentioning federal district courts had the effect
of permitting jurisdiction even if the amount in controversy did not satisfy § 1331. See
Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96, 97-98 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that
federal jurisdiction over § 1983 claims was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976)-
which does not have an amount in controversy requirement-even if the amount in
controversy requirement of § 1331 was not met); Caidin v. United States, 564 F.2d
284, 286 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that the question of § 1331 jurisdiction, and
§ 1331's amount in controversy requirement, was irrelevant in light of the explicit
grant of federal jurisdiction over personal injury actions against the United States in
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994)).
37. See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 5.2.1, at 253.
38. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.") with U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.").
39. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983)
(noting distinction between the Constitutional and statutory meanings of "arising
under"); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 5.2.3, at 263; Barry Friedman, A Dif-
ferent Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1, 21-22 (1990); William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation,
The Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 Ind. L.J. 211, 226-28
(1982) (discussing reasons for the narrow interpretation). There is very little legisla-
tive history to inform interpretations of § 1331. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8 (1983) (noting § 1331's "limited" legislative
history); James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Ques-
tions, 90 U. Penn. L. Rev. 639, 642-43 (1942) (asserting that "the history of [§ 1331]
y.. vields no reason for its enactment" and characterizing § 1331 as "'sneak' legisla-
tion;'). What legislative history does exist indicates Congressional intent that the stat-
ute be read as co-extensive with the constitutional grant of jurisdiction. See 2 Cong.
Rec. 4986 (1874) (statement of Sen. Carpenter). Commentators have argued that the
Supreme Court has "treated section 1331 as a general delegation of power to fashion
their own jurisdiction," Luneburg, supra, at 228, and "abandoned all pretense that it is
following Congress's intent in enacting [§ 1331]." Friedman, supra, at 21-22. Some
commentators, however, have suggested that the paucity of legislative history sur-
rounding § 1331 made the Court reluctant to assume that Congress intended the far-
reaching effects that a broad reading would have entailed. See Ernest J. London,
"Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 835, 840
(1959); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L.
Rev. 157, 162 (1953) (arguing that Congress was not confronted with the conse-
quences of a broad reading of § 1331 and thus it would be "blind subservience to
form" for courts to interpret it broadly). Indeed, this position has support in the
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test for deciding when a case fits the definition of "arising under" for
§ 1331 purposes." The Court's clearest statement has been that dis-
trict court jurisdiction exists in "only those cases in which a well-
pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause
of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law."41
One of the Supreme Court's earliest attempts to define § 1331 juris-
diction was Justice Holmes' statement, "[a] suit arises under the law
that creates the cause of action."42 Holmes intended his formulation
of "arising under" to be a principle of exclusion.43 In other words,
suits where federal law did not create the cause of action would not
"arise under" federal law. Courts, however, have noted that it "is
more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was in-
tended."" Nevertheless, in the 82 years since Holmes' statement, no
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 371 (1959) (stating that it is difficult to accept that a "most far-reaching
change" in maritime jurisdiction was effected "subterraneously" by § 1331).
40. See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 5.2.3, at 263; Wright, supra note 35, § 17, at
101; Michael D. Moberly, Begging the Federal Question: Removal Jurisdiction in
Wrongful Disdzarge Cases, 20 Seattle U. L. Rev. 81, 89 (1996).
41. Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 27-28. The term "well-pleaded complaint" refers to
the requirement that the federal question appear on the face of the complaint, and
not as a defense. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1968);
see also Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 5.2.3, at 263-68 (explaining the well-pleaded
complaint rule); Wright, supra note 35, § 18, at 108-13 (same) The meaning of "sub-
stantial question of federal law" is unclear, see Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 5.23, at
269-73 (tracing the Supreme Court's decisions in this area); Wright, supra note 35,
§ 17, at 106 (noting that there are "no clear answers" in this area), and there have
been proposals to reform this area of jurisdictional law. See, e.g., Donald L
Doeraberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule Sabotages The Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 Hastings
LJ. 597 (1987) (arguing that federal question jurisdiction should exist whenever the
resolution of a question of federal law will determine the outcome of the case); Linda
R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Juris-
diction Over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 Ind. L 1. 17, 22, 26 (1984)
(arguing for using Justice Holmes' statement in American Well Works Co. v. Layne &
Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916), as a principle of exclusion); Note, Over-Protec-
tive Jurisdiction?: A State Sovereignty Theory of Federal Questions, 102 Harv. L Rev.
1948 (1989) (proposing the elimination of substantial federal question jurisdiction for
state law claims).
42. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
43. See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 5.2.3, at 269; see also Hirshman, supra note
41, at 26-28 (analyzing the statement in conjunction with Holmes' dissent in Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214-15 (1921), to determine Holmes'
intent).
44. T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964); see also In re Three
Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A., Ltd. v. Morts, 878 F.2d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989)
("We recognize that Justice Holmes' test for determining the extent of federal juris-
diction is more useful as a test for inclusion rather than exclusion."); Enders v. Ameri-
can Patent Search Co., 535 F.2d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[The Holmes test] is still
'useful for inclusion [as opposed to] the exclusion for which it was intended.'... [WeJ
rely on it for its limited application: if a case meets the Holmes test, at least that case
'arises under' regardless of what ultimate test is applied." (quoting T. B. Harms, 339
1901
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court had ever held that Congress created a cause of action outside
the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction until the Fourth
Circuit examined the TCPA in International Science & Technology In-
stitute, Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc.45 There, the court held
that the federal private right of action in the TCPA did not "arise
under" § 1331.46
Even prior to Holmes' test, the Supreme Court had found that a
federal cause of action did not "arise under" federal law for the pur-
poses of § 1331 only in very limited cases involving mining rights.47
These cases were brought to enforce federal rights created by U.S.
Revised Statutes sections 2325 and 2326, which provided for federal
registration of mining claims.48 The most prominent of these cases
was Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter.4 9
In Shoshone Mining, the Court held that a suit under sections 2325
and 2326 to determine mining rights did not "arise under" the laws of
the United States for the purposes of the jurisdictional statute.50 The
rules of decision were to be taken from state or territorial law, as long
as that law did not conflict with federal law.51 The Court held that the
command to look to state law for the rules of decision weighed against
federal jurisdiction, because any "inquiry along Federal lines is only
incidental to a determination of the local question of what the State
has required and prescribed."5 The Court noted that litigants might
have to travel great distances to litigate in federal court. 3 The Court
also found it significant that Congress had chosen not to explicitly
grant federal jurisdiction in the statute without an amount-in-contro-
versy requirement.5 4 Thus, litigants with claims totaling less than the
F.2d at 827) (footnote omitted)). These courts recognize that although an action cre-
ated by federal law falls within § 1331's definition of "arising under," the fact that an
action is created by state law does not necessarily place it beyond § 1331. See supra
note 41 (discussing § 1331 jurisdiction when state law provides the cause of action but
there is a substantial question of federal law).
45. 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997).
46. Id. at 1158.
47. See Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912) (collecting cases).
48. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 2325 (now codified at 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1994)) established pro-
cedures for registering mining claims with the federal government. U.S. Rev. Stat.
§ 2326 (now codified at 30 U.S.C. § 30 (1994)) established procedures for resolving
disputed claims.
49. 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
50. Id. at 505-06. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 2326 required an adverse claimant-someone
who filed a claim to mining rights already claimed by someone else-"to commence
proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction[] to determine the question of the
right of possession." See U.S. Rev. Stat. § 2326 (now codified at 30 U.S.C. § 30
(1994)).
51. Shoshone Mining, 177 U.S. at 507-08.
52. Id. at 509 (quoting Miller's Executors v. Swann, 150 U.S. 132, 137 (1893)).
53. Id. at 513.
54. Id. at 510-11.
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$2000 minimum then required under the general federal question stat-
ute were forced to bring suit in state court.55
In other words, Congress did not deem the matter of the jurisdiction
of [Federal] courts so essential a part of the administration of the
land laws... as to vest in them jurisdiction of all such controversies,
but left a large if not a major portion of them to be determined in
the state courts.56
Although Shoshone Mining has been called "an anomalous turn-of
the-century case,"5 7 it has never been explicitly overruled by the
Supreme Court and, presumably, remains good law.' At least one
federal court, however, has taken jurisdiction over a claim under 30
U.S.C. § 30, the same statute at issue in Shoshone Mining, since Jus-
tice Holmes' statement in American Well Works.59
Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides federal jurisdiction whenever fed-
eral law creates the cause of action, with the possible Shoshone Min-
ing exception6' of actions where the rules of decision are to be taken
from state law. Yet, Congress continues to include jurisdictional lan-
guage in statutes that create federal causes of action. The following
section will examine the language Congress uses and its reasons for
doing so.
B. Specific Grants of Jurisdiction
Despite the general grant of federal question jurisdiction in § 1331,
Congress has often used jurisdictional language in statutes that create
a federal right of action. 61 When construing these or any other stat-
utes, courts begin "with the text of the provision in question, and
move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which
55. An amount in controversy requirement was part of the original general federal
question jurisdiction statute. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
56. Shoshone Mining, 177 U.S. at 511.
57. Blackmon Auctions, Inc. v. Van Buren Truck Ctr., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 287,291
(W.D. Ark. 1995). In Shoshone Mining, the Court was faced with a number of factors
that are unlikely to reoccur today: a statutory scheme enacted before the general
federal question statute, see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text, a lack of easily
accessible federal courts in the area where claims were likely to be brought, see supra
note 53 and accompanying text, and an amount in controversy requirement in the
general federal question statute, see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
58. See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 5.2.3, at 269 & n.76.
59. See Fargo v. McAlester Fuel Co., 532 F.2d 149, 151 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1976) (rec-
ognizing that the action before the court was a 30 U.S.C. § 30 claim and reaching the
merits with no mention of Shoshone Mining).
60. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure §§ 3569-85 (2d ed. 1984) (describing specific jurisdictional grants).
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it occurs."'62 In addition, courts must attempt to give meaning or ef-
fect to every word in a statute.63
In most cases, the plain language of a jurisdictional provision in a
statute is unambiguous. For example, Congress has provided that an
action "may be brought only in" a federal district court,64 that district
courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction '65 over an action, and that
federal court jurisdiction over some cases shall be "exclusive of the
courts of the States. ' 66 Such language plainly confers federal jurisdic-
tion while simultaneously divesting state courts of jurisdiction.67
Another example of clear statutory language is where Congress
either explicitly mentions district courts and other courts of "compe-
tent jurisdiction, "68 or provides explicitly for "concurrent" jurisdiction
in federal and state courts.69 This language grants jurisdiction to fed-
62. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995); see also BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462
U.S. 122, 128 (1983) (stating that the starting point in statutory interpretation is the
language of the statute itself); Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) (same); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (same).
63. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1990) (rejecting a stat-
utory interpretation that violates this principle); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to
every word Congress used."); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)
("It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."'
(quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))).
64. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(5) (1994) (providing for exclusive federal juris-
diction for claims of securities holders against investment advisors of registered secur-
ities companies for breach of fiduciary duty); 30 U.S.C. § 1734(b) (1994) (providing
for exclusive federal jurisdiction for suits by states to recover moneys due with respect
to any oil and gas leases on federal lands within the state).
65. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 25(c) (1994) (providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction of
private actions authorized under the laws regarding Commodities Exchanges); 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1994) (providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction of actions taken to
enforce the laws regarding Securities Exchanges); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1994) (provid-
ing for exclusive federal jurisdiction of civil enforcement actions under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act).
66. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1994) (providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction
for prosecutions under federal criminal laws); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994) (providing for
exclusive federal jurisdiction of cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); 28
U.S.C. § 1338 (1994) (providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction of suits arising under
the patent laws).
67. See Tafflin v Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 471 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4010(d) (1994) (providing for concurrent jurisdiction of
private actions against banks for violation of laws regarding funds availability); 15
U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1994) (providing for concurrent jurisdiction over actions to enforce
laws regarding consumer credit); 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1994) (providing for concurrent
jurisdiction over civil suits to enforce the laws prohibiting unfair labor practices).
69. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3007(c) (1994) (providing for concurrent jurisdiction over
civil actions under the laws regarding interstate horseracing); 28 U.S.C. § 1352 (1994)
(providing for concurrent jurisdiction of any action on a bond executed under any law
of the United States); 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(3) (1994) (providing for concurrent juris-
diction over actions arising from violations of the Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-
Motivated Violence Act).
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eral courts, while keeping the federal action within state courts' gen-
eral jurisdiction.7"
In other statutes, Congress has declined to explicitly mention a partic-
ular forum. For example, it has provided that an action may be
brought "in any court of competent jurisdiction"7 or simply "a
court."'72 These terms do not grant jurisdiction at all. Instead, they
define the cause of action, which then must be brought in a court de-
riving its jurisdiction from another source. For state courts, this source
is their status as courts of general jurisdiction.73 For federal courts,
this source is the general federal question jurisdiction statute,
§ 1331.74
There has been confusion when language defining a cause of action
has referred to federal courts, but has been silent about state court
jurisdiction.75 Congress has used a wide variety of statutory language
70. See, eg., Foxe Lady, Inc. v. National Tea Co., 701 So.2d 761,765 (La. Ct. App.
1997) ("29 U.S.C. § 187 expressly grants state and federal district courts concurrent
jurisdiction."). State courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and thus are presumed
to be competent to hear any case before them. See Bomar v. State, 300 S.W2d 885,
887 (Tenn. 1957) (noting that if a Court is one of general jurisdiction, -there is a
presumption that nothing shall be intended to be out of its jurisdiction"); see also
Black's Law Dictionary 684 (6th ed. 1990) (defining general jurisdiction as "[sluch as
extends to all controversies that may be brought before a court within the legal
bounds of rights and remedies").
71. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (creating a right of action for securities
holders to enforce laws prohibiting false statements in registration statements); 15
U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994) (providing a private action to enforce laws prohibiting insider
trading); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1994) (creating a right of action under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act).
72. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(3) (1994) (creating a right of action for a provider of
communications services denied access to customers under laws prohibiting obscene
phone calls); 49 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(3)(A) (1994) (establishing a mechanism for states or
indian tribes to challenge interstate highway routes promulgated by the Secretary of
Transportation).
73. See supra note 70 (defining general jurisdiction).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). For examples where federal courts have taken juris-
diction of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claims, authorized by
29 U.S.C. § 626(c), via § 1331, see Ryder v. Westinghouse Elea Corp., 128 F.3d 128,
130 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting jurisdiction was properly exercised under 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c) in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Moore v. University of Notre Dame,
968 F. Supp. 1330, 1332 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Johnson v. Cadillac Plastics Group, Inc., 908 F. Supp.
847, 850 (D. Colo. 1995) (same). At least one court, however, seemed to assume
jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) alone. See White v. Lincoln Plating Co.,
955 F. Supp 98, 99 (D. Colo. 1997) ("As the plaintiff brings a claim under the ADEA,
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(c).")
75. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 822 (1990) (noting the
circuit split regarding jurisdiction over Title VII claims); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,
458 (1990) (noting the circuit split regarding jurisdiction over civil RICO actions);
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477 & n.3 (1981) (noting conflict
regarding jurisdiction over suits arising under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act).
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when creating actions in this manner." Beginning in 1981, the
Supreme Court ended the confusion with its decisions in Gulf Off-
shore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. 77 Tafflin v. Levitt,78 and Yellow Freight
System, Inc. v. Donnelly.79
Gulf Offshore8" overturned a sixteen-year-old decision of the Loui-
siana Court of Appeals, Gravois v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,," in which
the Louisiana court held that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 2
("OCLSA") granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over suits
arising from activities on the continental shelf.8 3 The Supreme Court
noted that there is a "presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction" over federal claims.' 4 The presumption can be rebutted
by an explicit statutory directive. 5 The Court observed that the lan-
guage of OCLSA providing that the federal district courts "shall have
original jurisdiction" 6 operated only to grant jurisdiction to federal
courts.87 Furthermore, the Court noted, "It is black letter law.., that
the mere grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to
oust a state court from concurrent jurisdiction."8 8 Although the Court
stated that the presumption favoring state court jurisdiction could also
be rebutted by "unmistakable implication from legislative history[ ] or
by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal
interests,"8 9 neither factor weighed in favor of such a reading of
OCSLA. 90
76. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3416 (1994) (suits "may be brought" in federal court); 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994) ("Any person injured ... by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court."); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1994) ("Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action
in any Federal district court."); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1994) ("Each United States
district court... shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter."); 43
U.S.C. § 1349(b) (1994) (providing that federal district courts "shall have jurisdiction
of cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with" certain operations
conducted on the outer Continental Shelf).
77. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
78. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
79. 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
80. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
81. 173 So.2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
82. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as
amended in various sections of 43 U.S.C.). OCSLA provided that the federal district
courts "shall have original jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of, or in
connection with [certain] operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf." See
43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1976) (stricken and moved as modified to 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)
(1994)).
83. Gravois, 173 So.2d at 556. The court noted: "Had Congress intended to grant
concurrent jurisdiction to the State Courts it would have so specified in this Act." Id.
84. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 82.
87. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478-79.
88. Id. at 479.
89. Id. at 478.
90. Id. at 484.
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The Court was presented with a similar question in Tafflin.9' The
statute at issue in Tafflin was 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which authorizes
federal jurisdiction over civil RICO suits.92 Because there was "noth-
ing in the language of RICO ... to suggest that Congress ha[d], by
affirmative enactment, divested the state courts of jurisdiction," Taf-
flin argued that the legislative history revealed Congress's intent to
provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction. 93 That history, however,
contained no indication that Congress had ever even considered the
question of concurrent jurisdiction.94 The Court declined to impute
intent from this silence.95 Justice Scalia, concurring, labeled the legis-
lative history and conflict language in Gulf Offshore9 6 dicta, and ar-
gued that the only appropriate indicator of congressional intent was
the plain language of the statute. 7
Yellow Freight System,98 decided the same term as Tafflin, 9 tracked
the holding of the latter almost exactly. The plain language of the
statue in question provided that "[e]ach United States district court
... shall have jurisdiction of [private] actions" brought to enforce Title
Vll.1°° The Court held that this language did not "expressly confine[ ]
jurisdiction to federal courts or oust[ I state courts of their presump-
tive jurisdiction."' 0 '° The Court's analysis of the legislative history
found even stronger evidence for exclusive federal jurisdiction than it
confronted in Tafflin-several passages indicating that many
lawmakers "fully expected that all Title VII cases would be tried in
federal court."'" The Court ultimately found this unpersuasive:
That expectation, even if universally shared, is not an adequate sub-
stitute for a legislative decision to overcome the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction. Like its plain text, the legislative history of
the Act affirmatively describes the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
but is completely silent on any role of the state courts over Title VII
claims.10 3
91. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
92. The statute specifically provides that "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of [the criminal RICO statute] may sue therefor in
any appropriate United States district court." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
93. Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 460-61.
94. Id. at 461.
95. Id at 462 ("To rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the question
is not whether any intent at all may be divined from legislative silence on the issue,
but whether Congress in its deliberations may be said to have affirmatively or unmis-
takably intended jurisdiction to be exclusively federal.").
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
97. See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 469-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
98. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
99. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1994). Title VII prohibits unlawful discrimination
in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
101. Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 823.
102. Id. at 824 & n.4.
103. Id. at 824-25.
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Although the Court analyzed the legislative history, it appeared to dis-
tance itself from the legislative history and conflict tests of Gulf Off-
shore,0 4 stating that the absence of indications of Congressional
intent to divest state courts of jurisdiction in the text "is strong, and
arguably sufficient," evidence that Congress had no such intent.10 5
The holdings of the Gulf Offshore line of cases can be summarized
as follows: First, state courts are presumed to have jurisdiction over
federal actions by virtue of their status as courts of general jurisdiction
of sovereign states in our federal system. 10 6 Second, although Con-
gress has the power to foreclose state court jurisdiction over federal
actions, courts will not assume it exercised that power by implica-
tion.'07 If Congress does not explicitly make federal jurisdiction ex-
clusive, its intent must be shown by unmistakable legislative history,
or there must be a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdic-
tion and federal interests.'08 In addition, considered against the back-
drop of 28 U.S.C. § 1331,1o1 the holdings implicitly recognize that the
explicit mention of federal courts has little jurisdictional meaning.
Although Congress's mention of federal courts grants them jurisdic-
tion, those courts would have jurisdiction in any case via the general
federal question jurisdiction statute. 10 After these cases, explicit
mention of federal courts does not divest state courts of jurisdic-
tion."' Thus, the language has definitional meaning, as part of a
104. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
105. Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 823 (emphasis added). This statement may indicate
increasing support for Justice Antonin Scalia's position in Tafflin. See supra note 97
and accompanying text.
106. Gulf Offshore and its progeny each refer to a presumption of "concurrent"
jurisdiction. See Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 824; Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459
(1990): Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). Federal court
jurisdiction in those cases was not presumed, however, but was granted explicitly
through permissive language. See supra notes 82, 92, 100 and accompanying text.
Thus the "presumption" referred to was that state courts had jurisdiction over federal
actions.
107. See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
108. See id. For more in-depth discussions of this line of cases, see Daniel J. Capra,
Discretion Must be Controlled, Judicial Authority Circumscribed, Federalism Pre-
served, Plain Meaning Enforced, and Everything Must be Simplified: Recent Supreme
Court Contributions to Federal Civil Practice, 50 Md. L. Rev. 632, 661-66 (1991) (dis-
cussing Tafflin and Yellow Freight); Yolanda Eleni Stefanou, Concurrent Jurisdiction
over Federal Civil RICO Claims: Is it Workable? An Analysis of Tafflin v. Levitt, 64
St. John's L. Rev. 877 (1990); Meredith L. Hathorn, Comment, The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act: Vesting State Courts with Concurrent Jurisdiction-Gulf Offshore
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 6 Mar. Law. 327 (1981); Harsha Krishnan, Comment, Tafflin v.
Levitt: Concurrent Federal and State Jurisdiction Over Civil Rico, 16 J. Contemp. L.
357 (1990); Elizabeth Moshang, Recent Development, Concurrent State Court Juris-
diction in Title VII Claims: Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 33 B.C. L. Rev.
410 (1992).
109. See supra notes 25-60 and accompanying text.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
111. See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
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clause creating the cause of action, but no effective jurisdictional
meaning unless § 1331 is repealed.' 12
Another important intersection of specific jurisdictional grants and
the general federal question jurisdiction statute occurs where a spe-
cific grant of jurisdiction assigns a federal cause of action to courts
other than the federal district courts. 1 3 The specific statutes typically
do not explicitly mention § 1331.114 Instead, the statutes usually grant
"exclusive" jurisdiction to another federal court." 5 Thus, if they re-
peal all or part of § 1331's grant of jurisdiction, the repeal occurs by
implication.
116
It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that repeals by
implication are disfavored. 1 7 The Supreme Court has recognized
only two "well-settled" categories of implied repeals:
(1) Where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict,
the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied re-
peal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it
will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. 118
Without an affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, repeal by
implication is only justified when the earlier and later statutes are ir-
112. The explicit mention of federal courts in a statute creating a federal cause of
action would also have meaning if Congress reinstated § 1331's amount-in-contro-
versy requirement. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. In that event, fed-
eral courts would retain jurisdiction over actions under statutes that explicitly
mention federal courts in language defining a cause of action, regardless of the
amount in controversy. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 546-50
(1972) (holding that jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim below § 1331's amount-in-contro-
versy requirement was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)).
113. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(5)(B) (1994) (vesting Courts of Appeals with ex-
clusive jurisdiction to review rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission
defining unfair trade practices); 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1994) (vesting the Court of Interna-
tional Trade with exclusive jurisdiction over various federal actions).
114. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1535(e)(2) (Supp. 111996) (granting exclusive jurisdiction
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia over cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the detention of aliens); 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (granting
exclusive jurisdiction over certain actions to the Court of International Trade with no
mention of § 1331 in statute).
115. See, eg., 8 U.S.C. § 1535(e)(2) ("Jurisdiction over [a claim by an alien that
continued detention violates the alien's fights under the Constitution] shall lie exclu-
sively in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.");
28 U.S.C. § 1581(b) ("The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of any civil action commenced under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.").
116. An implied repeal occurs when a legislative enactment demonstrates an intent
to repeal preexisting laws without mention or reference to such laws. See 1A Norman
J. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Const. § 23.09 (5th ed. 1993).
117. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 547 (1988); Kremer v. Chemical Coast.
Corp, 456 U.S. 461,468 (1982); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
118. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); see also Radzanower
v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,154 (1976) (rejecting argument that the Securities
Exchange Act partially repealed the National Bank Act by implication because "the
'two acts' . . . fall into neither of [the Posadas] categories").
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reconcilable." 9  Otherwise, the rule is to give effect to both.120
Although the Court has sometimes spoken of the rule disfavoring im-
plied repeals as applying when a narrow, specific statute is arguably
repealed by a broadly applicable one,12' the Court has, in addition,
consistently applied the rule when a broad statute is arguably partially
repealed by a narrow one.12 2
When a specific jurisdictional statute grants exclusive jurisdiction
over a federal cause of action to a court other than a federal district
court, that statute irreconcilably conflicts with § 1331's grant of gen-
eral federal question jurisdiction.1 3 Consequently, it falls into the
first category of implied repeals recognized by the Supreme Court. 124
When faced with arguments of implied partial repeals of other juris-
dictional statutes, the Supreme Court has rejected them where the
statutes could be reconciled.12
Nevertheless, in International Science & Technology Institute, Inc. v.
Inacom Communications, Inc.,26 the Fourth Circuit seemed to find
that the Tucker Act 2 7 partially repealed § 1331 by implication. 12 The
Tucker Act established the Court of Claims as an Article III court in
which suits against the United States could be brought.1 29 The juris-
dictional portions of the Act grant the Court of Claims jurisdiction
119. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974).
120. See Borden, 308 U.S. at 198.
121. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 550-51; see also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 279-81
(1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that this is the only situation where the
maxim against repeals by implication has force); Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 158 (hold-
ing that a "narrowly drawn, specific.., provision., must prevail over [a] broader...
provision").
122. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 380-84 (1996)
(applying the rule to hold that § 27 of the Exchange Act did not partially repeal the
Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), by implication, and collecting re-
lated cases rejecting other implied partial repeals of § 1738); Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1017 (1984) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act did not partially repeal the Tcker Act by implication); United
States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 209-11 (1945) (holding that
the Webb-Pomerene Act did not partially repeal the Sherman Act by implication).
123. Jurisdiction cannot be exclusive in one court if it is permitted in another. See
Black's Law Dictionary 564 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "exclusive jurisdiction" as "[t]hat
power which a court ... exercises ... to the exclusion of all other courts").
124. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
125. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1017 (1984) (holding that the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not partially repeal the
Tucker Act by implication); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 546-50
(1972) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 did not effect an implied partial repeal of 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)).
126. 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997).
127. The Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
128. See International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc.,
106 F.3d 1146, 1154-55 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1997).
129. The Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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over all claims against the United States, 3 ' and the Court of Claims
and federal district courts concurrent jurisdiction over such suits
under $10,000.'1' The Tucker Act did not, however, explicitly grant
the Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction over actions for more than
$10,000 against the United States. 32 Nevertheless, that jurisdiction is
unquestionably exclusive. 33 The Fourth Circuit found that the "su-
perfluous" grant of concurrent jurisdiction over claims under $10,000
to federal district courts "leads quite naturally to the conclusion" that
the grant of jurisdiction over claims for more than $10,000 to the
Court of Federal Claims is exclusive.134
It is doubtful, however, that § 1331 ever included jurisdiction over
the kinds of federal claims addressed by the Tucker Act. The Court of
Claims was created in 1855,135 and because all government expendi-
tures had to be authorized by Congress, it was the only avenue avail-
able to plaintiffs with claims against the government.'1 The Court of
Claims could only issue advisory recommendations, which Congress
was free to ignore.'37 Until the Tucker Act was passed in 1887,'3 the
government enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit.139 Thus, when the
predecessor to § 1331 was passed in 1875,140 it could not have con-
ferred jurisdiction for claims against the United States unless it is also
read as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Courts have consistently re-
jected this reading. 4' Thus, the Tucker Act did not enact an implied
partial repeal of § 1331.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
131. See id. § 1346.
132. See i § 1491.
133. This is because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity in
other federal or state courts. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48
(1988); see also United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 172
(1976) ("[The Tucker Act... lodged exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Claims for
claims exceeding $10,000."); Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 9.2.4, at 565 (referring to
jurisdiction of the Claims Court as "exclusive").
134. International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106
F.3d 1146, 1155 n.2. (4th Cir. 1997).
135. Act of February 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
136. See Michael F. Noone, Jr. & Urban A. Lester, Defining Tucker Act Jurisdiction
After Bowen v. Massachusetts, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 571, 574-75 (1991).
137. See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 9.2.4, at 564.
138. The icker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
139. See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, § 9.2.4, at 565 ("The Tucker Act is clearly a
waiver of sovereign immunity for suits for money damages against the United
States.").
140. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)).
141. See, e.g., Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1997)
(noting that a plaintiff "may not rely on ... 28 U.S.C. § 1331" when seeking to sue the
United States); Voluntary Purchasing Groups v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1385 (5th Cir.
1989) ("[I]t is well settled that section 1331 'implies no general waiver of sovereign
immunity."' (quoting A.L. Rowan & Son, General Contractors v. HUD 661 F.2d 997,
1000 (5th Cir. 1980))); Cotter Corp. v. Seaborg, 370 F.2d 686,692 n.15 (10th Cir. 1966)
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The wide variety of jurisdictional language used by Congress to cre-
ate federal actions must be read against the backdrop of § 1331 to be
properly understood. Although in some cases the language has some
jurisdictional effect, at times that effect is minimal or nonexistent. The
courts have been careful, therefore, to read the language as restric-
tions on other sources of jurisdiction only when congressional intent
has been explicit or the restriction is absolutely necessary to fulfill the
purposes of the statute. The next section will examine the legislative
history of the TCPA for evidence of either of these factors.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TCPA
The history of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act can be
traced back to 1989, when three bills aimed at regulating the
telemarketing industry were introduced in the House of Representa-
tives.' 42 H.R. 628141 and H.R. 2131'11 were both aimed at regulating
the use of autodialers,'45 while H.R. 2184 was aimed at unsolicited
facsimile advertisements ("junk faxes"). 46 Each of these bills called
for the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to promulgate
regulations to curb abuses of these technologies. 47 None of the bills
contained enforcement provisions, relying instead on FCC's enforce-
ment power under the Communications Act of 1934.141
The bills were introduced at a time when the telemarketing indus-
tries' use of these emerging technologies had begun to attract legisla-
("28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . does not waive the sovereign's immunity."); Anderson v.
United States, 229 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1956) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 "cannot
be relied on" to support a suit against the United States).
142. H.R. 628, 101st Cong. (1989), was introduced January 24, 1989, by Rep. Bar-
ney Frank. H.R. 2131, 101st Cong. (1989), was introduced April 26, 1989 by Rep.
Marge Roukema. H.R. 2184, 101st Cong. (1989), was introduced May 2, 1989, by Rep.
Edward J. Markey.
143. H.R. 628, 101st Cong. (1989). The bill would have amended the Communica-
tions Act to require phone companies to maintain lists of customers that objected to
autodialed telephone calls. Id. The bill would also have prohibited autodialed calls to
anyone on such lists. Id.
144. The Automated Telephone Solicitation Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 2131,
101st Cong. (1989). The bill would have amended the Communications Act to pro-
hibit all autodialed calls before 9 a.m. and after 5 p.m., and require autodialers to
release telephone lines no later than five seconds after the called party hung up. Id.
145. An autodialer is an automatic dialing device which has the capacity "to store
or produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; to
dial such numbers; and to deliver a prerecorded message to the number dialed, with
or without manual assistance." H.R. 2131.
146. The Facsimile Advertising Regulation Act, H.R. 2184, 101st Cong. (1989). The
bill would have amended the Communications Act to require phone companies to
maintain lists of customers that objected to unsolicited faxes. Id. The bill would also
have prohibited unsolicited faxes to anyone on such lists. Id.
147. See H.R. 2184; H.R. 2131; H.R. 628.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 503 (1994). Section 503 authorizes the FCC to impose fines to
enforce the Communications Act , which each of the bills would have amended. See
H.R. 2184; H.R. 2131; H.R. 628. The provision authorizes penalties of up to $10,000
per violation to be determined by the FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)-(D).
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tive scrutiny. In 1989, legislation to curb industry abuses was
introduced in 27 states,' 49 and ultimately passed in both Maryland'
and Connecticut.' 51 Because of the federal preemption in the Com-
munications Act of 1934,152 however, states could only regulate intra-
state calls.153 Thus, federal legislation was needed to fully address the
growing problem.
15 4
Following Congressional hearings held on May 24, 1989,155 all three
bills were passed by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance and sent to the full Committee on Energy and Commerce.
There, Rep. Markey combined the bills and reintroduced the legisla-
tion as the Telephone Advertising Regulation Act ("TARA") on July
18, 1989.156 The new bill sought to establish a national "do not call"
list of telephone subscribers who objected to receiving junk faxes or
autodialed telemarketing calls.' 57 TARA contained no new enforce-
ment provisions, again relying on the FCC's enforcement powers
under the Communications Act.' 58
As TARA was making its way through the legislative process,'59 the
Senate history of the TCPA began wvith the Telemarketing & Con-
149. See Paul Farhi, Lawmakers Prepare Message to "Junk" Phone Solicitors; Com-
plaints Prompt Moves to Curb Industry, Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1989, at Cl;
Kathleen Killette, Subcommittee Supports Fax Ad Regulation, CommunicationsWeek,
July 31, 1989, at 36.
150. Md. Code Ann. Commercial Law § 14-1313 (1990).
151. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570c (1991). Ironically, opponents of the Connecticut
bill, which prohibited junk faxes, provided Governor William O'Neill with a splendid
example of the problem when they inundated his fax machine with messages urging a
veto. See Faxing Flurry Backfires, Law On Curbs OKd, Newsday, May 18, 1989, at 5.
The Governor, who had been waiting for a report on flooding in the state to arrive by
fax, promptly signed the measure. Id. A similar lobbying effort was tried in Maryland,
with similar effect. See Michael J. Ybarra, Comnputer-Driven Sales Pitches: Up to
Their Ears in Junk, Phone and Fax Users Say, L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1989, at 1.
152. Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
153. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369-70 (1986) (holding
that the Communications Act preempted state regulation of interstate calls); National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492, 1498-1501 & n. 6 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (same); Ivy Broad. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.
1968) (same).
154. See supra note 19.
155. Telemarketing Practices: Hearing on H.R. 628, H.R 2131, and H.R. 2184
before the Subcomm. on Telecommn. and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong. (1989), microfonned on Sup. Docs. No. Y4.En2J3:101-43
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
156. Telephone Advertising Regulation Act, H.R. 2921, 101st Cong. (1989).
157. Id.
158. 47 U.S.C. § 503 (1994). Section 503 authorizes the FCC to impose fines to
enforce the Communications Act, which TARA would have amended. See Telephone
Advertising Regulation Act, H.R. 2921, 101st Cong. (1989).
159. TARA was marked up and sent to the full Energy and Commerce Committee
on July 20, 1989. See 136 Cong. Rec. D825 (daily ed. July 20, 1989). The bill was sent
to the full House on May 15, 1990. See 136 Cong. Rec. D605 (daily ed. May 15, 1990).
"Marking up" is the process by which a committee or subcommittee prepares the final
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sumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act ("TCFAPA"), introduced by
Senator Bryan on April 23, 1990.161 The bill directed the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") to promulgate "rules regarding
telemarketing activities."'' Among the rules the FTC was directed
to consider was a ban on autodialed calls by equipment that did not
immediately release the line if the called individual hung up.162
TCFAPA included three different enforcement provisions.163 First,
violations of the new rules were to be considered unfair or deceptive
acts affecting commerce prohibited by § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.'" Second, a cause of action was to be created under
which state attorneys general could bring enforcement actions.165
Third, a private right of action was to be created, with a minimum
amount in controversy of $50,000.166 The bill provided that the fed-
eral district courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction" over these new
civil actions.'67 Following subcommittee hearings, 68 the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported the bill to
the full Senate on July 26, 1990.169
As TCFAPA awaited action by the full Senate, TARA came up for
vote before the full House on July 30, 1990.17° Five Representatives
spoke in favor of the bill, and none spoke in opposition.' 7 1 None of
the Representatives mentioned the enforcement provisions.172 The
version of the bill it is sending to a larger deliberative body. For an excellent explana-
tion of the legislative process, see Robert B. Dove, Enactment of a Law (visited Feb-
ruary 7, 1998) <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/enactment/enactlaw.html>.
160. Telemarketing & Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, S. 2494, 101st
Cong. (1990).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994). The Federal Trade Commission is authorized to order
any person, partnership, or corporation to "cease and desist" any unfair or deceptive
act or practice affecting commerce. See id. § 45(b). Violations of such orders can re-
sult in fines of up to $10,000 per violation. See id. § 45(1).
165. Telemarketing & Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, S. 2494, 101st
Cong. § 4 (1990).
166. Id. § 5.
167. Id. §§ 4-5. This language has been interpreted by courts as conferring federal
jurisdiction while permitting state jurisdiction. See supra notes 75-106 and accompany-
ing text.
168. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud: Hearing on S. 1441 and S. 2494 before the
Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp.,
101st Cong. (1990), microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y4.C73/7:S.hrg.101-765 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office).
169. See 136 Cong. Rec. D953 (daily ed. July 26, 1990). The bill was amended
slightly. See S. Rep. No. 101-396, at 3 (1990).
170. 136 Cong. Rec. H5818 (daily ed. July 30, 1990).
171. Id. at H5818-22. Reps. Markey, Ritter, Frank, Roukema, and McMillen spoke
in favor of the bill. Id.
172. Id.
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bill passed by voice vote.173 The next day, the Bush administration
threatened to veto the legislation. 74
The Senate passed TFCAPA on October 22, 1990.175 On October
26, TARA was placed on the Senate calendar. 176 Both bills died, how-
ever, when no further action was taken on them before the session
ended on November 2, 1990.177
Rep. Markey reintroduced the legislation in the 102nd Congress as
the Telephone Advertising Consumer Rights Act ("House TACRA
bill") on March 6, 1991.178 The House TACRA bill was substantively
identical to TARA of the 101st Congress, 179 except that it included
exceptions for calls made by non-profit organizations and to people
with whom companies had a previously existing relationship."co No
new causes of action, either public (by states' attorneys general) or
private, were contemplated by the bill. 81 Following hearings on April
24,182 the bill was approved by the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce's Subcommittee on Telecommunication and Finance on May
9,183 and by the full Committee on July 30, 1991.11
Two bills, the Telephone Advertising Consumer Rights Act"
("Senate TACRA bill") and the Automated Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, 18 6 ("TCPA bill") were introduced in the Senate during
the same Congressional session. Both bills directed the FCC to pro-
mulgate regulations to restrict the use of junk fax and autodialed calls,
and neither of them provided for any new causes of actions."s The
only substantive difference between the bills was that the Senate
173. Id. at H5822.
174. Bill to Restrict 'Junk Fax' Faces Opposition by Bush, Newsday, Aug. 1, 1990, at
43. The Administration felt the bill was unnecessary because -'[the number of com-
plaints are small and there are already systems and infrastructures in place to deal'
with the problem." Id (quoting Alixe Glen, White House deputy press secretary).
175. See 136 Cong. Rec. S16,488 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990). A technical amendment
to the bill was also passed. See id at S16484.
176. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17,295 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990).
177. See 136 Cong. Rec. D1454 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990).
178. Telephone Advertising Consumer Rights Act, H.R 1304, 102nd Cong. (1991).
179. See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
180. H.R. 1304.
181. Id.
182. Telemarketing/Privacy Issues: Hearing on HR 1304 and H.R. 1305 before the
Subcomm. on TeleconuL and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102nd Cong. (1991), microformed on Sup. Does. No. Y4.En2I3:102-9 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office).
183. 137 Cong. Rec. D563 (daily ed. May 9, 1991).
184. 137 Cong. Rec. D1011 (daily ed. July 30, 1991).
185. Telephone Advertising Consumer Rights Act, S. 1410, 102nd Cong. (1991).
The bill was sponsored by Senator Pressler. Id. Senator Pressler also introduced S.
1442, by the same title, but no action was taken on it. See Telephone Advertising
Consumer Rights Act, S. 1442, 102nd Cong. (1991).
186. Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act, S. 1462, 102nd Cong. (1991).
The bill was introduced by Senator Hollings. Id.
187. See S. 1410; S. 1462.
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TACRA bill would have prohibited all unsolicited telemarketing
calls,188 while the TCPA bill only applied to autodialed calls.189
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
held hearings on both bills on July 24, 1991, in Washington, D.C., 190 on
October 10, in Greenville, S.C.,191 and October 11, in Columbia,S.C.192 FCC Chairman Alfred C. Sikes submitted a statement to the
Committee for the July 24 hearing, in which he expressed the adminis-
tration's view that "special legislation may not be needed" and that
some provisions of the bill would cost the FCC at least $70 million
initially and $20 million annually in recurring costs. 19 3
It was during testimony at the July 24 hearing where the private
right of action and actions by states' attorneys general were first men-
tioned publicly.194 Robert Bulmash, president and founder of Private
Citizen, Inc., a privacy-rights organization, testified that his group fa-
vored "a civil action on the part of the consumer capable of being
brought against telemarketers who call in defiance of our previously
expressed will." 195 Bulmash also expressed skepticism about the
FCC's willingness to enforce the law against telemarketers. 196 Steve
Hamm, Administrator of the South Carolina Department of Con-
sumer Affairs, similarly expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the
law with only FCC enforcement, 97 but felt that private actions might
be "difficult" to bring due to the "relatively small dollar amounts"
involved. 98 Instead, he favored enforcement by the states:
I think that individual States, perhaps the attorney generals and
consumer protection officials ought to, in these statutes, have the
ability to bring an action against businesses where we generate cer-
tain levels of complaint. I think that would help the Federal Gov-
ernment. I think it would help make the statutes self-enforcing, and
the potential, the real potential that someone in fact is going to en-
188. See S. 1410.
189. See S. 1462.
190. S. 1462, The Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; S. 1410,
The Telephone Advertising Consumer Protection Act; and S. 857, Equal Billing for
Long Distance Charges: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 102nd Cong. (1991) [hereinafter
"July 1991 TCPA Hearings"], microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y4.C73/7:S.hrg.102-960
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
191. Computerized Telephone Sales Calls and 900 Service: Hearings before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 102nd Cong. 1 (1991), microformed
on Sup. Docs. No. Y4.C73/7:S.hrg.102-918 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
192. Id. at 31.
193. See July 1991 TCPA Hearings, supra note 190, at 54-55 (statement of Alfred
Sikes). Sikes stated that the problems causes by autodialers and unsolicited faxes
could be addressed by already existing laws, "market conditions," or very limited new
regulations the FCC was already considering. Id.
194. See id. at 28-29 (testimony of Steve Hamm and Robert Bulmash).
195. Id. at 29 (testimony of Robert Bulmash).
196. Id. (testimony of Robert Bulmash).
197. Id. at 32 (testimony of Steve Hamm).
198. Id. (testimony of Steve Hamm).
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force the prohibitions contained in whatever legislation you ulti-
mately find acceptable will, in fact, cause changes in the
marketplace.' 99
A more concrete proposal was received from Michael Jacobson,
cofounder of the Center for the Study of Commercialism. 2 0 Jacobson
proposed a private right of action with damages set at $500 plus attor-
ney's fees.2°' Jacobson also expressed doubts about the effectiveness
of FCC enforcement. 2 Support for civil sanctions was also expressed
by Thomas Stroup, president of Telocator, an association of paging
and cellular telecommunications providers.2 3
The provisions for the private right of action and action by states
attorneys general were added as a result of information obtained in
these hearings.' Senator Hollings noted,
Several parties, including the Federal Communications Commission
<FCC> itself, raised concerns that the FCC might not have the re-
sources to pursue violators of this bill. The will of the FCC to en-
force the bill rigorously was also questioned, especially since the
chairman of the FCC... indicate[d] that he believed the bill was
unnecessary. 20 5
Speaking specifically about the private right of action provision, the
Senator said:
The substitute bill contains a private right-of-action provision that
will make it easier for consumers to recover damages from receiving
these computerized calls. The provision would allow consumers to
bring an action in State court against any entity that violates the bill.
The bill does not, because of constitutional constraints, dictate to
the States which court in each State shall be the proper venue for
such an action, as this is a matter for State legislators to determine.
Nevertheless, it is my hope that States will make it as easy as possi-
ble for consumers to bring such actions, preferably in small claims
court. The consumer outrage at receiving these calls is clear. Un-
less Congress makes it easier for consumers to obtain damages from
those who violate this bill, these abuses will undoubtedly continue.
Small claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer to
appear before the court wvithout an attorney. The amount of dam-
ages in this legislation is set to be fair to both the consumer and the
199. Id. at 29 (testimony of Steve Hamm).
200. The Center for the Study of Commercialism is a consumer group whose mis-
sion is "to help stop the unwanted permeation of advertising into practically every
comer of American life." See July 1991 TCPA Hearings, supra note 190, at 40 (state-
ment of Michael Jacobson).
201. Id at 42, 44 (testimony of Michael Jacobson).
202. Id. at 44 ("If beleaguered citizens had to rely on the FCC, I am dubious that
the law would ever be enforced.").
203. Id. at 47 (testimony of Thomas Stroup).
204. See 137 Cong. Rec. S16,205-06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Hollings).
205. Id at S16,206.
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telemarketer. However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if
the attorneys' costs to consumers of bringing an action were greater
than the potential damages. I thus expect that the States will act
reasonably in permitting their citizens to go to court to enforce this
bill.2
0 6
Following these remarks, the Senate approved an amendment adding
the new causes of action to the TCPA bill, and approved the bill itself
by voice vote. 0 7 The Senate TACRA bill was also approved the same
day.208
The House TACRA bill came up for vote in the House on Novem-
ber 18, 1991. Seven members spoke in favor of the bill, with none
opposed.0 9 There was no mention of the enforcement provisions of
the bill.210 Eight days later, the House considered the TCPA bill.2 l '
The House amended the bill to include some provisions of the House
TACRA bill. 2  Once again, several Representatives spoke in favor of
the bill, but none spoke of the civil enforcement provisions. 213 The
House passed the TCPA bill as amended and sent it back to the
Senate.214
The Senate approved the amendment the next day. 1 Senators
Hollings and Pressler spoke briefly, and neither mentioned the new
enforcement provisions.2 16 President Bush, in signing the bill, also
made no mention of the provisions.2 17
Because the private right of action was added as an amendment
after the committee report on the bill was issued, Senator Hollings's
statement is the only authoritative indication of congressional intent
available. Because he explicitly cited the hearings as the impetus for
the provision, this part has examined testimony relating to enforce-
ment provisions. The next part will examine how circuit courts have
read this history when determining Congressional intent.
206. Id. at S16,205-06.
207. Id. at S16,208.
208. See id. at S16204. The private enforcement provisions that were added to S.
1462 were also added to S. 1410. See id. at S16,294-95.
209. See 137 Cong. Rec. H10,341-44 (daily ed. Nov 18, 1991). Reps. Markey, Rich-
ardson, Rinaldo, Roukema, Fish, Cooper, and Lent spoke in favor of the bill. Id.
210. Id.
211. 137 Cong. Rec. H11,307 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
212. Id. at H11,310. The portions of the House TACRA bill dealing with unsolic-
ited faxes were inserted into the TCPA bill in place of that bill's fax provisions.
213. Id. at H11,310-15.
214. Id. at H11,315.
215. 137 Cong. Rec. S18,781-86 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991).
216. Id.
217. George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1877 (Dec. 20, 1991).
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IX. ANALYZING THE CIRCUIT DECISIONS HOLDING THAT STATE
COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE
TCPA ACTIONS
Only three circuits, the Fourth, Fifth and the Eleventh, have de-
cided whether federal courts have jurisdiction over the private right of
action under the TCPA.21 8 The TCPA reads, in relevant part:
Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permit-
ted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate
court of that State-
(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regula-
tions prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violations,
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a viola-
tion, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, which-
ever is greater, or
(C) both such actions.2 19
Each circuit court held that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over private TCPA actions.22° This part examines the similarities and
differences between the circuit courts' analyses.
Both the Fourth Circuit, in International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc.
v. Inacom Communications, Inc.,21 and the Fifth Circuit, in Chair
King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp.,'2 held that the language provid-
ing that private TCPA actions "may" be brought in state court granted
state courts jurisdiction over these actions.22 Both courts also recog-
nized that the primary question before them was whether the statute
also implicitly granted concurrent jurisdiction to federal courts.224 In
International Science, the plaintiff argued that Tafflin v. Levitt2 5 man-
218. See Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1998);
Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997); International
Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir.
1997).
219. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (1994). In this Note, the phrase "if otherwise permitted
by the laws or rules of court of a State" will be called the "opt out provision," because
it apparently would allow a state to refuse to permit the action in its courts.
220. See Nicholson, 1998 WL 101942, at *3-*4; Chair King, 131 F.3d at 509; Interna-
tional Science, 106 F.3d at 1149.
221. 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997).
222. 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997).
223. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 511 ("The TCPA... expressly grants jurisdiction
to state courts ... ."); International Science, 106 F.3d at 1151 ("In using the customary
'may' language for conferring jurisdiction, Congress ... authorizes jurisdiction by
stating that an action nmy be brought there." (footnote omitted)).
224. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 514 ("[W]e are presented with the question of
whether Congress intended to grant federal courts implied concurrent jurisdiction of
federal claims that it expressly granted state courts jurisdiction to adjudicate."); Inter-
national Science, 106 F.3d at 1151 (addressing this question and concluding that Con-
gress did not grant federal courts concurrent jurisdiction by use of permissive
language authorizing state court jurisdiction).
225. 493 U.S. 455 (1990). Tafflin held that permissive language granting federal
courts jurisdiction does not divest state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction over
federal claims. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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dated that such permissive language operated to grant concurrent ju-
risdiction to both federal and state courts.226 The Fourth Circuit
rejected this argument, holding that permissive language authorizing
state court jurisdiction cannot implicitly grant federal courts jurisdic-
tion.227 The Chair King plaintiffs made a similar argument to the Fifth
Circuit, citing Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.228 for support.22 9
The Fifth Circuit declined to apply Gulf Offshore to determine
whether there was federal jurisdiction over private TCPA actions, and
concluded that the TCPA did not grant federal courts jurisdiction. 30
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently adopted these holdings. 31
Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits found support for the holding
that the language creating the TCPA's private action did not grant
federal courts jurisdiction in other provisions of the TCPA, the rest of
the Communications Act, and the legislative history of the TCPA. 32
Both courts found it "significant" that Congress provided for exclusive
federal court jurisdiction over actions brought by states2 33 under the
TCPA.z34 Moreover, the courts noted that in other portions of the
Communications Act, Congress has specifically provided for concur-
rent jurisdiction in federal and state courts.2 35 Both courts also specif-
ically cited Senator Hollings's statement on the Senate floor" 6 for
support, stating: "While Senator Hollings did not explicitly say that
only state court jurisdiction was appropriate, we believe the clear
thrust of his statement was consistent with the bill's text that state
courts were the intended fora for private TCPA actions. '237 The Fifth
Circuit also suggested that if Congress had intended federal court ju-
risdiction over private TCPA actions, the TCPA would have included
provisions making it possible for consumers to easily recover damages
226. See International Science, 106 F.3d at 1152.
227. Id. (holding that 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (1994) did not grant jurisdiction to fed-
eral district courts).
228. 453 U.S. 473 (1981). Gulf Offshore held that permissive language granting
federal courts jurisdiction does not divest state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction
over federal claims. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
229. Chair King, 131 F.3d at 514.
230. See id.
231. See Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citing Chair King and International Science).
232. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 512-13; International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v.
Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1152-53 (4th Cir. 1997).
233. 47 U.S.C. § 227(0(2).
234. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 512; International Science, 106 F.3d at 1152.
235. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 512-13 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 207, 214(c), 407,
551(f)(1), 553(c)(1), 555(a), 605(e)(3)(A)); International Science, 106 F.3d at 1152 (cit-
ing 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(c), 407, 415(0, 553(c)(1), 555(a), 605(e)(3)(A)). But see infra
notes 363-66 and accompanying text (citing other sections of the Communications Act
where Congress used ambiguous statutory language).
236. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
237. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1153; see also Chair King, 131 F.3d at 513
(quoting International Science).
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in federal court without an attorney. 38 The Chair King court con-
cluded that Congress's failure to include such provisions meant it did
not intend federal courts to hear private TCPA claims?3 9
Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits also referred to the line of cases
where the Supreme Court considered whether there was an implied
right of action in a federal statute. 4 To find an implied right of ac-
tion, courts must infer congressional intent to create such an action in
"the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other
source." 241  Although both circuits recognized that the question
before them was different than the issue of an implied right of ac-
tion,242 they nevertheless noted that because Congress created a rem-
edy in state court, it would flout congressional intent to find an
additional remedy in federal court. 43
The circuit courts differed in their approach to the question of juris-
diction over private TCPA actions pursuant to § 1331. The Fourth
Circuit observed that § 1331's "arising under" is narrower than the
similar constitutional language,2 and that ultimately the scope of the
district courts' jurisdiction depends on congressional intent.2 45 Never-
theless, it recognized that because the TCPA private right of action
was created by federal law, it fell among the "vast majority" of cases
where federal question jurisdiction exists under § 1331.46
The court went on to note, however, that despite the usual reliabil-
ity of the Holmes test, "[the Supreme] Court has sometimes found
that formally federal causes of action were not properly brought
238. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 513.
239. See i.
240. See id at 511-12; International Science, 106 F.3d at 1155. An implied right of
action is a private right to sue for a violation of a regulatory statute, even though the
statutory scheme does not explicitly mention private suits. See, e.g., Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (finding an implied right of action for viola-
tions of Title IX, which prohibits gender discrimination in education); see also Fallon
et. al., supra note 27, at 839-46 (discussing implied rights of action).
241. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981).
242. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 511 (adverting to implied right of action cases "by
analogy"); International Science, 106 F.3d at 1155 (noting that because the TCPA ex-
plicitly created a private remedy, the court did not need to consider the question of an
implied right of action).
243. See Chair King, 131 F.3d at 512 ("[V]here a statute expressly provides a rem-
edy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies.") (quoting
Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989))); Interna-
tional Science, 106 F.3d at 1155 ("[If] Congress did not intend a private federal rem-
edy for violations of the statute that it enacted ... it would flout congressional intent
to provide a private federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute." (quoting
Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 811-12 (1986))).
244. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1153; see also supra notes 38-39 and accom-
panying text.
245. International Science, 106 F3d at 1153-54.
246. Id. at 1154 ("A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."
(quoting American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,260 (1916)
(Holmes, J.))).
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under federal-question jurisdiction. '247 When the Supreme Court has
found that Congress intended for state court jurisdiction to be exclu-
sive, as in Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, it has honored that intent
despite unclear language.248 Furthermore, the court listed several par-
tial repeals of § 1331, including an implied repeal by the Tucker
Act.2 49 Thus, § 1331 gives the district courts jurisdiction only if no
specific statute assigns jurisdiction elsewhere.25 0 A federal law that
creates a cause of action may also manifest a particular intent to as-
sign jurisdiction to courts other than the federal district courts.251 The
court concluded that the TCPA manifested such an intent in the ex-
plicit mention of State courts, thus defeating jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.12 The Eleventh Circuit likewise adopted this
approach.253
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by synthesizing cases interpret-
ing § 1331 and stating that the Holmes test25 4 is "only a starting point"
for determining on which court or courts Congress intended to confer
jurisdiction.2" "Inferior federal courts' 'federal question' jurisdiction
ultimately depends on Congress's intent as manifested by the federal
statute creating the cause of action." 6 According to the Chair King
court's analysis, § 1331 does not grant jurisdiction unless Congress in-
dicates an intent for § 1331 to do so in the statute creating a particular
federal cause of action." 7 Thus, it was unnecessary for the court to
247. Id. at 1154 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814
n.12 (1986)).
248. Id. at 1154 (citing Shoshone Mining Co v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 511 (1900)).
For a brief explanation of Shoshone, see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
249. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1154-55 & n.2. The court noted that the
lhcker Act's explicit announcement of concurrent jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1346
would be superfluous if § 1331 already conferred concurrent jurisdiction, thus leading
"quite naturally" to the conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1491 confers exclusive jurisdiction
to the Court of Federal Claims. Id. at 1155 n.2. Similarly, the explicit mention of state
courts in the TCPA would be superfluous as jurisdictional language, because state
courts are presumed to have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce federal laws. Id. But
see supra notes 127-41 and accompanying text (arguing that the Ticker Act was not
an implied partial repeal of § 1331).
250. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1154.
251. Id. at 1155.
252. Id.
253. See Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citing International Science).
254. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
255. Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 510-11 (5th Cir.
1997).
256. Id. at 511 (citing International Science, 106 F.3d at 1153-55).
257. Id. at 510-11. No other court has ever described § 1331's operation in this
manner. Defining § 1331 this way, however, is consistent with some commentary ar-
guing that § 1331 permits the federal courts to fashion their own rules in the jurisdic-
tional area. See Luneburg, supra note 39, at 228 ("[Slection 1331 can be seen as a
delegation of law-making power in the procedural area that has its analogue in the
substantive sphere in the Sherman Antitrust Act."); see also supra note 39 (citing
commentators who assert that the Court has implicitly taken this view).
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address the repeal of § 1331 jurisdiction by the TCPA because the
TCPA manifested no intent for § 1331 to apply1-'
'Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits also found support for their deci-
sions in analyses not undertaken by other courts interpreting the
TCPA. The Fifth Circuit noted that "a statute should be construed in
a way that gives meaning and effect to all [its] provisions.""a9 The
Chair King court observed that because of the presumption in favor of
state court jurisdiction,26 the explicit mention of state courts would
be unnecessary to confer concurrent jurisdiction on state and federal
courts.26 Thus, to give the mention of state courts meaning, it must
be construed "as more than a confirmation of concurrent
jurisdiction." 2
The Fourth Circuit addressed the constitutional questions posed by
the TCPA.263 Specifically, International Science argued that if state
court jurisdiction was exclusive, the provisions permitting states to opt
out of jurisdiction' violated the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment.265 Citizens of states that opted out would be de-
prived of a federal right under the TCPA, while citizens of states that
permitted the private actions would enjoy the federal right, thus re-
sulting in unequal protection of the laws. 6 Furthermore, Interna-
tional Science argued that the grant of exclusive state court
258. See Chair King, 131 F3d at 511, 513 (defining the question presented by the
case as whether Congress implicitly granted federal courts concurrent jurisdiction
over private TCPA actions).
259. Chair King, 131 F.3d at 512.
260. See id (citing Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78
(1981); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459-61 (1990)). For brief descriptions of Gulf
Offshore, Tafflin, and the presumption in favor of state court jurisdiction, see supra
notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
261. Chair King, 131 F.3d at 512.
262. Id
263. See International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc.,
106 F.3d 1146, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1997).
264. See supra note 219.
265. The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause has an equal protection component that is substan-
tively equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-18 (1995). The Equal Protec-
tion Clause provides that "No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
266. See International Science, 106 F.3d at 1156 (explaining International Science's
argument).
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jurisdiction violated the Tenth Amendment,267 because it comman-
deered state courts for federal purposes. 26
The court dispensed with the equal protection question on two
grounds.269 First, the court stated that even if some states opted out,
citizens of those states would not be deprived of the equal protection
of the law, because the substantive rights conferred by the statute
would still be enforceable by the state or federal government.2 70 Sec-
ond, because the challenged classification was not based on a funda-
mental right or impermissible characteristic such as race, religion, or
national origin, any equal protection challenge would subject the
TCPA to mere rational basis scrutiny.271  The court held that the
TCPA's opt-out provision would pass rational basis scrutiny based on
congressional findings suggesting a huge number of potential
claims.272
The court also rejected the Tenth Amendment argument.273 Con-
gress "went out of its way to avoid overstepping the limits of the Tenth
Amendment by explicitly recognizing the states' power to reject en-
forcement in their courts of the federally created right" by including
the opt-out provision.274 Thus, Congress avoided commandeering
state resources in the way the Supreme Court found impermissible in
New York v. United States.2 75 The court cited this as further evidence
that Congress intended to make state court jurisdiction exclusive, be-
267. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. The Supreme Court
has held that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from mandating state legisla-
tion, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), or commandeering state
officials to enforce federal law, see Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
268. See International Science, 106 F.3d at 1157.
269. Id. at 1156-57.
270. Id. at 1156 (noting that the "right to be free from unsolicited faxes" would still
be enforceable by state attorneys general or the FCC).
271. Id. at 1156-57 ("Under [rational basis scrutiny], the Act is entitled to a strong
presumption of validity, and must be sustained if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." (quoting Thom-
asson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996))).
272. Id. at 1157.
273. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1157-58.
274. Id. at 1157.
275. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). New York involved a challenge to the Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which required states to provide for the
disposal of waste generated within their borders. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021c (1992). The
Court held that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from requiring the states
to enact legislation. New York, 505 U.S. at 149. For a more in-depth discussion, see
Richard D. Weiner, Casenote, New York v. United States: Federalism and the Dispo-
sal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste, 34 Nat. Resources J. 197 (1994); see also Martin
H. Redish, Doing it with Mirrors: New York v. United States and Constitutional Limi-
tations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 593
(1994) (criticizing the Court's decision).
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cause there could be no question of commandeering if federal courts
had concurrent jurisdiction.276
Thus, the Circuit Courts agreed that the language of the TCPA per-
mitting state court jurisdiction did not implicitly grant federal courts
concurrent jurisdiction, based on the text of the TCPA, its legislative
history, and comparisons with other provisions of the Communica-
tions Act. The courts disagreed on the applicability of § 1331. The
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits recognized that the TCPA arose under
federal law for § 1331 purposes, but held that the TCPA had defeated
§ 1331 jurisdiction by assigning permissive jurisdiction to state courts.
The Fifth Circuit held that § 1331 jurisdiction did not apply because
Congress did not indicate in the TCPA that it intended § 1331 to ap-
ply. Only the Fifth Circuit held that it was necessary to interpret the
TCPA's mention of state courts as excluding federal courts from juris-
diction to give such mention meaning and effect. Only the Fourth Cir-
cuit addressed the constitutional questions raised by the TCPA's
private action. The following part examines the only decision to ex-
pressly hold that federal courts have jurisdiction over private TCPA
actions, and argues that its analysis is correct.
IV. KENRO, IlNC v. FAX DAILY, ZNC277 AND THE ARGUMENT FOR
FEDERAL DISTRIcT COURT JURISDICTION
Although the circuit courts correctly determined that the language
of the TCPA does not explicitly grant federal courts jurisdiction over
private TCPA actions,27 8 the courts erred in their treatment of 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 grants federal district courts jurisdiction
over federal claims such as private TCPA actions.279 Thus, if the
TCPA's language permitting state court jurisdiction over private ac-
tions defeats federal jurisdiction under § 1331, the TCPA partially re-
peals § 1331 by implication.' None of the circuit courts interpreting
the TCPA analyzed the legislative history with the rigor required 2s to
find an intent to repeal § 1331 by implication.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in International Science
was explicitly rejected by Chief Judge Sarah Evans Barker of the
Southern District of Indiana.' Two years earlier, in Kenro, Inc. v.
276. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1158 ("Apparently recognizing that the ex-
clusivity of state court jurisdiction could create a problem .... Congress avoided any
constitutional issue by refusing to coerce states to hear private TCPA actions ...
277. 904 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
278. See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing partial repeals of
§ 1331 ).
281. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of im-
plied repeals).
282. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
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Fax Daily, Inc., 3 the judge had considered for the first time in any
court the question of federal court jurisdiction over private TCPA ac-
tions. 2 4 The court found that federal courts had concurrent jurisdic-
tion. 5 Part IV.A. examines that decision. Part IV.B. argues that it is
correct and the circuit courts' analyses were faulty.
A. KENRO, Ic. V. FAX DAILY, INC
28 6
Although there had been private TCPA cases filed or removed to
federal courts before the Kenro decision,287 Kenro was the first case
where the jurisdiction of federal courts over such actions was chal-
lenged.288 The case had been originally fied in state court, and re-
moved by the defendant to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441. 8  The plaintiff moved for remand, arguing that the TCPA
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in state courts.290
The Kenro court began its analysis by recognizing that, because the
TCPA is a federal law that expressly provides for a private cause of
action, a complaint asserting a private TCPA claim "clearly presents a
federal question."12 91 Thus, jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 133 1.212 The court distinguished Supreme Court cases involving
substantial federal questions in state causes of action,293 noting that
private TCPA actions do not involve any state law claims. 294
The court recognized that to reach the conclusion that state courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over private TCPA actions, it would have
to find an implied partial repeal of § 1331.95 The court refused to do
283. 904 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
284. Id. at 914 (noting that this question "ha[d] not been addressed by any court in
the United States").
285. Id. at 915.
286. 904 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
287. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (citing federal TCPA cases in which
non-jurisdictional decisions were published).
288. Kenro, 904 F. Supp. at 914.
289. Id. at 912-13. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 authorizes removal to federal court of any case
filed in state court in which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
290. Kenro, 904 F. Supp. at 913.
291. Id. at 914.
292. See id. at 915.
293. See, e.g. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (federal
ingredient in state law claim); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850-51 (1985) (same); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Labor-
ers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (same). In those cases, courts must deter-
mine whether the federal question is "substantial." See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
294. Kenro, 904 F. Supp at 914.
295. Id. ("Plaintiff apparently concludes that by explicitly providing for actions in
state court, Congress meant to revoke federal question jurisdiction provided for by 28
U.S.C. § 1331 ... ."); see also supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text (discussing
implied repeals).
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so.2 96 The court denied a motion to reconsider following the Fourth
Circuit's decision in International Science. 9 7
Thus, the Kenro Court properly recognized the applicability of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and declined to find an implied partial repeal. Its analy-
sis, however, was not comprehensive and did not include the legisla-
tive history of the TCPA. The following part undertakes a more
thorough analysis, including a review of the legislative history, to ar-
gue that federal courts have jurisdiction over private TCPA actions.
B. Why federal district courts have jurisdiction over private TCPA
actions
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that
power authorized by a constitutional statute.98 Once jurisdiction is
granted, however, federal courts are not free to restrict that jurisdic-
tion.299 Congress granted federal district courts jurisdiction over fed-
eral causes of action in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.300 Because Congress did not
clearly divest that jurisdiction in the language of the TCPA,311 it is
improper for courts to adopt a rule that does so.
"A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." As
a principle of inclusion, this has not been seriously challenged once in
the 82 years since it was announced.0 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has cited it approvingly many times.30 4 It is only unreliable as a princi-
296. Id at 915. ("[We will not assume that the language in the TCPA providing for
a private right of action in state court was meant to repeal federal question jurisdic-
tion which exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."). The court analogized the question of an
implied repeal of § 1331 jurisdiction by the TCPA to the question of the implied re-
peal of the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, by the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). Kenro, 904 F. Supp. at 914-15. FIERRA
provides that the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") may remove cases to the
District of Columbia or the district where the institution's principal business is lo-
cated. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3). The Seventh Circuit held that this provision was
not an implied repeal of § 1441 prohibiting RTC from removing cases to other district
courts. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1991). In-
stead, the provision permitted removal to the district courts listed in addition to those
permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Id It is important to note, however, that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 explicitly states that its provisions will apply "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly
provided by Act of Congress." See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994) (emphasis added). Title
28, section 1331 of the U.S. Code contains no such provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1994).
297. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
298. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994);
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62, 66 (1934);
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 21, 22, 7 Cranch 32, 33 (1812).
299. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135 (1992).
300. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
301. See infra notes 327-82 and accompanying text.
302. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
(Holmes, J.).
303. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986)
(citing American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
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ple of exclusion: although a case asserting a claim created by federal
law necessarily "arises under" that law, a case asserting a claim cre-
ated by state law may still "arise under" federal law for the purposes
of § 1331.305
The only cases ever to find a federal action did not "arise under"
§ 1331 were Shoshone Mining and its related cases. 30 6 The Shoshone
Mining court relied on two specific statutory provisions to infer Con-
gress's intent to have those claims heard exclusively in state court: the
incorporation of state and local law as the rules of decision, and the
amount-in-controversy requirement in the general federal question ju-
risdiction statute, which would not be met by the majority of actions
under the statute at issue in Shoshone Mining.3 7 Neither of those
factors are present here.
Substantive rights under the TCPA are defined completely by the
federal statute and FCC regulations. 3 8 Indeed, enforcement actions
by the state or federal governments must be brought in federal
court.30 9 Thus, the federal courts need not delve into state and local
law to adjudicate TCPA claims as they would have needed to under
U.S. Rev. Stat. § 2326 in Shoshone Mining.31°
Moreover, the scope of the general federal question jurisdiction
statute has been expanded since Shoshone Mining. When Congress
removed the amount-in-controversy requirement in 1980, it explicitly
provided for a federal forum for all "arising under" cases, regardless
of their size.31' Thus, courts can no longer find that a federal right
Congress establishes is not important enough to support § 1331 juris-
diction based on Congress's failure to provide for a federal forum in
all actions to vindicate that right.3 12
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850-51 (1985) (same); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Con-
struction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (same); Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959) (same). Arguably, the
narrow interpretation of § 1331 has been a wholly judicial creation. See Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. at 8 n.8 (noting that the language of the statute tracks similar language
in Article III, section 2 and its limited legislative history suggests that Congress's in-
tent was to confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred); Friedman,
supra note 39, at 21-22 (noting that "the Court has abandoned all pretense that it is
following Congress's intent" in construing § 1331). Nevertheless, Congress has not
addressed the Court's interpretations despite its revisions and re-enactments of the
statute. See id. at 24 & n.134.
305. See T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964); supra note 44
and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
308. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
309. See id. § 227(0(2); id. § 503(b)(3)(B) (directing the Attorney General to re-
cover penalties assessed by the FCC, see supra note 148 and accompanying text, in a
federal district court).
310. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 36.
312. This is exactly what the Court did in Shoshone Mining. See supra notes 55-56
and accompanying text.
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Assuming that Shoshone Mining is still good law,313 it is nonetheless
inapplicable to the TCPA private right of action. Because the TCPA
is a federal law creating a right of action, it "arises under" federal law
per the Holmes test.3 14 The Fifth Circuit decision, however, treats
§ 1331 as if it is a mere factor to consider when divining the Congres-
sional intent of a specific jurisdictional grant.3 15 This cannot be the
case. If it were, the existence of § 1331 would be considered evidence
of congressional intent to grant federal jurisdiction when it uses lan-
guage such as "any court of competent jurisdiction" or "a court. '316
Thus, distinctions in statutory language between "Federal and state
courts," "a court," "federal courts and any other court of competent
jurisdiction," and "any court of competent jurisdiction" would be
meaningless.317 Moreover, if § 1331 had to operate in conjunction
with another statute to confer jurisdiction, it could not support juris-
diction of common-law federal claims. The Supreme Court, however,
has held that it does.318 Thus, jurisdiction is proper under § 1331 un-
less Congress enacted a partial repeal of § 1331 in the TCPA.31 9
Every court to analyze the text of the TCPA's private right of action
provision has agreed that the language does not explicitly grant state
courts exclusive jurisdiction.320 Congress did not, therefore, enact an
313. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
314. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912, 913-14 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
315. See Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 511 (5th Cir.
1997) ("Inferior federal courts' 'federal question' jurisdiction ultimately depends on
Congress's intent as manifested by the federal statute creating the cause of action.");
supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (noting that the explicit mention
of federal courts grants those courts jurisdiction, but simply mentioning "a court"
does not).
318. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
850 (1985) ("It is well settled that [§ 1331's] grant of 'jurisdiction will support claims
founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin."' (quoting
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972))). But see Luneburg, supra note
39, at 228 ("Section 1331 is largely a residual grant intended to cover those matters
not falling within the specific grants.").
319. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text (discussing partial repeals of
§ 1331).
320. See Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11 th Cir. 1998)
(noting that "the Act is silent as to federal court jurisdiction"); Chair King, Inc. v.
Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The TCPA is silent as to
whether the express jurisdictional grant to state courts is exclusive or is coupled with
an implicit concurrent grant of jurisdiction to federal courts."); International Science
& Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1151 (4th Cir. 1997)
("Use of the term 'may' does not itself confer exclusive jurisdiction on the court men-
tioned."); Murphey v. Lanier, No. 97-CV-1784-BTM(POR), 1998 WL 154410, at *3
(S.D. Ca. Mar. 30, 1998) ("[Tlhe use of the term 'may' in a jurisdictional provision of
a statute does not by itself confer exclusive jurisdiction on the court mentioned explic-
itly."); Foxhall Realty Law Offices v. Telecommunications Premium Servs., Ltd., 975
F. Supp. 329, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The statutory language [of § 227(b)(3)] explicitly
confers permissive jurisdiction .... (emphasis added)); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc.,
904 F. Supp. 912, 914 ("[§227(b)(3)] has two possible interpretations: that state courts
1929
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explicit partial repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in the TCPA, as it has in
other Acts.321 The Fourth Circuit held that the language permitting
private TCPA actions in state courts nonetheless defeated § 1331 ju-
risdiction.322 That court, however, failed to consider the doctrine of
implied repeals in its analysis.3"
"[lit is... a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals
by implication are not favored."32 4 "[W]here two statutes are 'capable
of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effec-
tive."'' 325 As noted above, there was no clearly expressed congres-
sional intention, so § 1331 jurisdiction must apply unless the two
statutes irreconcilably conflict.326
The TCPA and § 1331 do not conflict at all. By the plain text of 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), state courts' jurisdiction over private TCPA ac-
tions is permissive, not exclusive.327 Thus, concurrent federal jurisdic-
tion conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not conflict with the TCPA's
grant of permissive state court jurisdiction.328 Conflicts between stat-
utes do not occur under these circumstances, 329 but rather when two
statutes can be read to apply to the same situation and yield inconsis-
tent results.33 °
have exclusive jurisdiction.. ., or that state courts and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction.").
321. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 244-52 and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit adopted
this analysis. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
323. The court probably did so because of its mistaken belief that the Tucker Act
effected an implied partial repeal of § 1331. See supra note 249 and accompanying
text. For a brief explanation of the Tucker Act and its relationship to § 1331, see
supra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
324. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661 (1986); see also Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) ("It is well settled.., that repeals by implica-
tion are not favored, and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is 'clear and
manifest."' (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)). For a
discussion of implied repeals, see supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
325. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984). Ruckelshaus in-
volved a dispute over whether the jurisdiction conferred by the Tucker Act, see supra
note 127 and accompanying text, had been partially repealed by certain provisions of
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et
seq. The Court concluded that no repeal of Tucker Act jurisdiction was intended,
although it had to imply a requirement that remedies under FIFRA be exhausted
before Tucker Act relief was sought to reconcile the two statutes. Id. at 1017-18
326. See Campbell v. Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth., 175 F.R.D. 531, 535 n.3 (D.
Minn. 1997) ("Repeal by implication is disfavored unless the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable.").
327. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
328. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912, 914 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
329. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547 (1972) (finding no con-
flict between the statute giving federal courts specific jurisdiction over § 1983 claims
and the statute setting forth the minimum jurisdictional amount for federal courts,
because the latter could be read to apply to only the general jurisdictional statutes).
330. For example, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), both the
FIFRA and the Tucker Act arguably applied where an EPA regulation adversely af-
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On the other hand, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' readings of the
TCPA's legislative history suggest a potential conflict with § 1331 be-
cause the circuits conclude that the legislative history evinces Con-
gressional intent that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
private TCPA actions.331 The TCPA's legislative history, however, is
sketchy and ambiguous.3 32 Moreover, the circuit courts' interpretation
of the TCPA's legislative history is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of similar history in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp. ,'3 3 Tafflin v. Levitt,3a  and Yellow Freight System, Inc. v.
Donnelly.335
The Fourth Circuit rejected the application of Tafflin because "a
statute authoriz[ing] suit in state courts ... through the use of the term
'may,' ... cannot confer jurisdiction on a federal court because federal
courts are competent to hear only those cases specifically author-
ized. '336 But Gulf Offshore and Tafflin do not hold that permissive
language referring to federal jurisdiction confers state court jurisdic-
tion.337 Indeed, by emphasizing states' positions as sovereigns in our
federal system, the cases implicitly reject the notion that Congress can
confer any jurisdiction at all on state courts. Instead, the source of
state court jurisdiction is each state's individual sovereignty, as recog-
nized by our federal system.338
fected Monsanto by releasing trade secrets into the marketplace. Id. at 1016-19.
Under FIFRA, Monsanto could obtain an injunction to prevent the EPA action. Id. at
1017. Under the Tucker Act, Monsanto could only bring a suit for compensation after
the action. l at 1016-19. FIFRA contains a provision providing that an entity that
fails to submit to its procedures forfeits its right to compensation, and Monsanto ar-
gued that this indicated Congress's intent that there be no Tucker Act remedy. Id. at
1018. The Court, however, reconciled the conflicting statutes by requiring plaintiffs to
exhaust administrative remedies under FIFRA before filing Tucker Act claims. Id. at
1018. For another conflict-and-reconciliation, see Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,267-73
(1981) (reconciling 1964 amendments to Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act and
Mineral Leasing Act ("WRRSA") by restricting application of WRRSA to acquired
refuge lands). For a case where two statutes in conflict could not be reconciled, see
Guam v. Quinata, 704 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that Guam Crim. and Corr.
Code § 7.10 repealed Guam Civ. P. Code §§ 251-52 by implication).
331. See supra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
332. Although Senator Hollings describes state courts' jurisdiction over private
TCPA actions, nowhere in the legislative history of the TCPA is the jurisdiction of
federal courts, or § 1331 explicitly discussed. See supra notes 178-217 and accompany-
ing text. Moreover, Senator Hollings never refers to state court jurisdiction as -exclu-
sive." See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
333. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
334. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
335. 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
336. International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106
F.3d 1146, 1151-52 (4th Cir. 1997)
337. See supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
338. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ("Under [our federal] system of
dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority
... to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States." (emphasis ad-
ded)); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,478 (1981) (-This rule [that
state courts have jurisdiction over federal causes of action] is premised on the relation
1931
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The Fifth Circuit made a similar error, rejecting application of Gulf
Offshore because "we are presented with the question of whether
Congress intended to grant federal courts implied concurrent jurisdic-
tion of federal claims that it expressly granted state courts jurisdiction
to adjudicate."'339 As noted above, Congress does not "grant" state
courts jurisdiction,34 ° and did not do so in the TCPA.341 The court
conflated the definitional use of the language, by which Congress was
merely defining the cause of action, and the jurisdictional use of the
language, by which it confers jurisdiction. 42
A proper reading of the Gulf Offshore cases is not that use of the
permissive "may" regarding federal jurisdiction grants state courts ju-
risdiction, but that states have inherent jurisdiction over any federal
claim created by use of such permissive language, unless it is unmis-
takably clear that Congress intended otherwise. 43 Thus, state courts
have jurisdiction over federal actions by virtue of their status as courts
of general jurisdiction of sovereigns in our federal system, unless Con-
gress unmistakably divests them of jurisdiction.344 Similarly, federal
between the States and the National Government within our federal system. The two
exercise concurrent sovereignty . . ").
339. Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added).
340. One commentator, however, does speak of the power of Congress to grant
state courts jurisdiction, even over state law claims. See Louise Weinberg, The Power
of Congress Over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 731, 755 (1995)
("Arguably it is even possible to read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a source of national power to confer jurisdiction upon ... state courts
adjudicating nonfederal cases .... ").
341. Despite this error, the circuit courts were correct in noting that the presump-
tion of jurisdiction enjoyed by state courts as courts of general jurisdiction, see supra
notes 84, 106 and accompanying text, does not apply to federal courts, which must be
explicitly granted jurisdiction, see supra note 298 and accompanying text. Section
1331, however, explicitly grants federal courts jurisdiction over federal claims, be-
cause such claims "arise under" federal law. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying
text.
342. Many uses of jurisdictional language have definitional meaning but little or no
jurisdictional meaning. For example, language explicitly stating that a cause of action
may be brought in federal or state court is almost purely definitional because jurisdic-
tion is conferred to federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and is inherent in state courts'
general jurisdiction. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. Even permissive
language mentioning only federal courts is more definitional than jurisdictional, be-
cause it would have jurisdictional meaning only in the event that the general federal
question jurisdiction statute was repealed. The language of the TCPA is purely defini-
tional: Because Congress cannot "confer" jurisdiction on state courts, the language
operates only to define the cause of action.
343. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473 (1981).
344. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. Because of the importance of
state sovereignty in our federal system, a more stringent test than the one set forth in
Gulf Offshore may be appropriate. See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that legislative history, even if unmistakably clear, should not defeat state
court jurisdiction); see also Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Juris-
diction, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 383 (1991) (arguing that only a clear statement in the text is
appropriate to defeat state court jurisdiction). It is the analysis of the legislative his-
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courts have jurisdiction over federally created causes of action via 28
U.S.C. § 1331, 345 unless Congress clearly repeals that statute in whole
or in part.4 Thus, the Gulf Offshore cases are instructive for the
proper use of legislative history to infer Congressional intent to with-
draw pre-existing jurisdiction.4 7 Viewed through the lens of the Gulf
Offshore framework for analyzing legislative history, the history of a
statute creating a federal cause of action, such as the TCPA, should
not defeat § 1331 jurisdiction unless it is unmistakably clear that Con-
gress intended otherwise.3"
Far from being clear, the legislative history and its analysis by the
circuit courts reveal the wisdom of Judge Leventhal's words.3 9 The
legislative history of the provision in question consists solely of Sena-
tor Hollings's remarks; both the Senate and the House had issued
their reports before the bill was amended, and no one other than the
Senator mentioned the provisions in debate. 5 0 Yet, on this thin reed
the Fourth Circuit imputed congressional intent to partially repeal a
law that has survived a century. 351
A careful look at the Senator's remarks, however, reveals that not
once did he mention the alleged exclusivity of state court jurisdic-
tion.3 52 There is no indication in his remarks that Congress even con-
sidered the question of concurrent jurisdiction. 53 The Supreme Court
found similar history inconclusive in Tafflin, '3  and, contrary to the
circuit courts' interpretation, it is inconclusive here.
tory in the Gulf Offshore cases, however, that is instructive here. For detailed analy-
ses of federalism and sovereignty, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425 (1987); Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue of Judicial Feder-
alism in the United States, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 835 (1995).
345. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 113-16 and accompanying text (discussing explicit partial re-
peals of § 1331); supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing rule requiring
"irreconcilable conflict" for repeal by implication).
347. For a proposal for a statute to guide courts' use of legislative history in inter-
preting jurisdictional statutes, see Bernard S. Meyer, Some Thoughts on Statutory In-
terpretation with Special Emphasis on Jurisdiction, 15 Hofstra L Rev. 167 (1987).
348. Note that the test for finding an implied repeal of a statute and the test for
finding an implied intent to restrict state court jurisdiction over a federal action are
nearly identical. Compare supra note 119 and accompanying text (stating the rule that
repeal of a statute by implication occurs only when there is an affirmative showing of
an intention to repeal or if the statutes are irreconcilable), with supra note 89 and
accompanying text (stating that the presumption of state court jurisdiction over a fed-
eral action can be rebutted by unmistakable implication in legislative history or clear
incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests).
349. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (describing the history of the
federal question jurisdiction statute).
352. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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A reading of the transcripts of the hearings mentioned by the Sena-
tor does not make Congress's intent any clearer.35 5 Multiple witnesses
advocated adding enforcement provisions into the bill.356 Some ex-
pressed skepticism about FCC enforcement.357 Some witnesses men-
tioned the relatively low dollar amounts at issue in private actions.358
None of them, however, spoke about jurisdiction. 9
At most, the Senator's remarks and the hearing transcripts taken
together reveal an assumption among many participants that the pri-
vate actions would be brought in state small claims court. This does
not, however, constitute affirmative evidence that Congress intended
that jurisdiction over private TCPA actions be exclusive to state
courts. Yellow Freight36° teaches that even a universally shared expec-
tation that claims would be brought in one court cannot be an ade-
quate substitute for a legislative decision to defeat jurisdiction in
another court.361 Thus, the assumption that private TCPA actions
would be brought in state small claims courts cannot be an adequate
substitute for a legislative decision to partially repeal 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Other parts of the circuit courts' analyses also wither under sus-
tained scrutiny. For example, the significance of explicit grants of con-
current jurisdiction in some parts of the Communications Act 362 is
considerably undermined by ambiguous grants of jurisdiction in other
parts of the Act.363 Moreover, there is a split among state courts over
whether the provision of the Communications Act which permits pri-
vate actions for injuries resulting from violations of the Act 364 in
"either" the FCC or a federal district court,365 ousts state courts from
355. See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. Senator Hollings explicitly
mentioned these concerns on the Senate floor. See supra note 205 and accompanying
text.
358. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. One proposal included attorney's
fees, presumably to encourage enforcement. See supra note 201 and accompanying
text.
359. See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
360. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
361. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
363. See 47 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1994) (action for injunction "may" be brought in fed-
eral district court); id. § 406 ("[federal] district courts ... shall have jurisdiction"); id.
§ 532(d) (party "may" bring action in federal district court); id. § 551(f) (same).
364. 47 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
365. The Fifth Circuit listed § 207 among provisions of the Communications Act
explicitly granting concurrent jurisdiction to federal and state courts. See supra note
235 and accompanying text. This was an error.
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jurisdiction over such actions.366 Thus, Congress may have explicitly
mentioned state courts to avoid confusion with § 207.67
The significance of the TCPA's grant of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over cases brought by states3" is also questionable. 369 The Kenro
court found that the language granting exclusive federal jurisdiction
over state claims "has no bearing whatsoever" on the jurisdiction of
the TCPA's private claims.3 70 Moreover, the provision for exclusive
federal jurisdiction of state claims supports two contradictory infer-
ences. On the one hand, a grant of exclusive jurisdiction may be evi-
dence that Congress considered the effects of concurrent jurisdiction.
On the other hand, use of the word "exclusive" in the state action
provision and its omission in the private action provision may suggest
a conscious choice of concurrent jurisdiction. The circuit courts
presented no justification for preferring the former inference over the
latter.37'
In addition, the circuit courts' reliance on cases involving implied
rights of action is misplaced. 3 2 Although it is true that courts should
not provide remedies that Congress did not intend,373 Congress did
provide a private remedy in the TCPA, which would be identical in
federal or state court.3 74 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit's concern that
permitting federal jurisdiction would strip the language mentioning
state courts in the TCPA of its meaning is unfounded.375 The lan-
guage would continue to have jurisdictional meaning because it pre-
vents confusion between the TCPA and other provisions of the
Communications Act.37 6 It would also have definitional meaning as
part of the clause creating the private right of action.377
366. Compare Van Dussen-Storto Motor Inn, Inc v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 338
N.Y.S.2d 31, 34-35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (holding that federal district courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over § 207 claims) with US Sprint Communications Co. v. Com-
puter Generation, Inc., 401 S.E.2d 573, 575 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that states
have concurrent jurisdiction over § 207 claims).
367. Interestingly, database searches reveal no state court opinions on cases filed
under provisions of the Communications Act granting permissive federal court juris-
diction. See supra note 363 and accompanying text (listing relevant statutes). Thus,
although state courts presumably have jurisdiction per the Gulf Offshore cases, see
supra notes 77-106 and accompanying text, it is possible, given the text of § 207, that
state courts do not have jurisdiction over Communications Act claims unless Congress
specifies concurrent jurisdiction over a particular cause of action.
368. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(f) (1994).
369. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
370. Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912, 914 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
371. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
374. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
375. See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 364-67 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction be-
tween jurisdictional meaning and the definitional meaning of jurisdictional language
that creates a cause of action).
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Finally, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the Tenth Amend-
ment would pose no bar to a congressional mandate that state courts
enforce a federally created right.3 78 Since Testa v. Katt,37 9 it has been
clear that states cannot arbitrarily refuse to enforce federal law.380
Thus it cannot be true, as the Fourth Circuit suggests, that the inclu-
sion of the provision permitting states to opt out of permitting TCPA
actions is further evidence that state jurisdiction was to be exclu-
sive.381 At best, it is meaningless. At worst, it would place the statute
in violation of the Fifth Amendment without federal court jurisdiction
ensuring at least one forum for all citizens. 382
CONCLUSION
Title 28, section 1331 of the U.S. Code is worthy of the same respect
accorded any federal statute. Although the Supreme Court has never
announced a clear test to determine if a case "arises under" federal
law for the purposes of § 1331, it has been clear for 82 years that a
federal cause of action will support § 1331 jurisdiction. Any statute
that removes a federal cause of action from the jurisdiction of federal
district courts partially repeals § 1331. If such a statute does not ex-
plicitly mention § 1331, it repeals § 1331 by implication.
Repeals by implication are appropriate only when congressional in-
tent to repeal is clear or two statutes are irreconcilable. There is no
reason that this rule should have less force for § 1331. Courts should
not be free, therefore, to find clear intent to repeal § 1331 jurisdiction
by attending the cocktail party of legislative history and spotting a few
"friends." Instead, there must be explicit mention of "exclusive" juris-
diction in courts other than the federal district courts or explicit men-
tion of the inapplicability of § 1331 to the cause of action being
created.
The TCPA's legislative history contains neither an explicit mention
of "exclusive" state court jurisdiction nor a mention of § 1331. In ad-
dition, the TCPA's language permitting private actions in state courts
does not conffict with § 1331's grant of jurisdiction over cases "arising
under" federal law to federal district courts. Thus, the Fourth, Fifth,
378. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text (providing Fourth Circuit's
analysis).
379. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
380. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 393-94; see also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1022-30 (1995) (asserting that Congress is constitutionally
permitted to require state courts to recognize federal claims). Indeed, the Madis-
onian Compromise giving Congress discretion to create lower federal courts would be
meaningless if Congress lacked this power. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies
of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141, 1153-54 (1988) (discussing the Madisonian
Compromise).
381. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
382. It is likely, however, that the statute would pass rational basis scrutiny. See
supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
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and Eleventh Circuits erred in holding that jurisdiction over private
TCPA actions is exclusive to state courts. Federal district courts have
jurisdiction of private TCPA actions through § 1331's grant of general
federal question jurisdiction.
Notes & Observations
